Legal Protection for Creditors with Fiduciary Guarantees in Credit Agreements
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine Legal Protection for Creditors with Fiduciary Guarantees in Agreements and to examine what legal remedies are available to creditors after the debtor defaults. This type of research is empirical legal. The data sources in this study are based on primary data and secondary data. This study uses a sociological legal approach. The data collected from library research is then analyzed qualitatively. The research data after being analyzed using qualitative methods, obtained the results that: Legal Protection for Creditors with Fiduciary Guarantees in Credit Agreements (Case Study at PT. Bintang Mandiri Finance, Kudus Regency) if the debtor defaults, with the UUJF is the granting of preferential rights over his receivables and then according to the provisions of Article 21 paragraph (4) of the Fiduciary Law, the results of the transfer and/or bills that arise, by law become objects of fiduciary guarantees replacing the objects of fiduciary guarantees that are transferred. With the inclusion of the value of goods or objects that are used as objects of fiduciary guarantee, if the object used as the object of fiduciary guarantee does not exist or is not available according to what is listed in the attachment, then the recipient of the fiduciary in this case the creditor can sue the party providing the fiduciary to fulfill its obligations, namely the amount of the guaranteed value as regulated in Article 6 of the UUJF and the legal remedies owned by the creditor after the debtor defaults, which is carried out at PT. Bintang Mandiri Finance Kudus Regency is the settlement of its dispute. First of all, it is done by giving a warning in the form of a reprimand, then continued by giving a warning letter to the debtor, but if the debtor still does not fulfill it, the creditor can take further action, namely through non-litigation and litigation.
Keywords: Creditors; Fiduciary; Guarantee; Protection.
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