Legal Protection for Creditors with Fiduciary Guarantees in Credit Agreements

Alex Komang


The purpose of this research is to examine legal protection for creditors with fiduciary guarantees in agreements and examine what legal remedies creditors have after the debtor defaults. This type of research is empirical juridical. The data sources in this research are based on primary data and secondary data. This research uses a sociological juridical approach. The data that has been collected from library research is then analyzed qualitatively. After analyzing the research data using qualitative methods, the results obtained were: Legal Protection for Creditors with Fiduciary Guarantees in Credit Agreements (Case Study at Pt. Bintang Mandiri Finance, Kudus Regency) if the debtor defaults, UUJF is given preferential rights over the receivables and then in accordance provisions of Article 21 paragraph (4) of the Fiduciary Law, then the transfer proceeds and/or claims that arise, by law become a replacement fiduciary security object for the transferred fiduciary security object.

With the inclusion of the value of the goods or objects that are used as the object of fiduciary collateral, if the object that is used as the object of fiduciary collateral does not exist or is not available as stated in the attachment, then the party receiving the fiduciary, in this case the creditor, can demand that the party giving the fiduciary fulfill its obligations. namely the amount of value guaranteed as regulated in Article 6 UUJF and the legal remedies that the creditor has after the debtor defaults, which is carried out at PT. Bintang Mandiri Finance Kudus Regency is dispute resolution. First of all, this is done by giving a warning in the form of a warning, then continued by giving a warning letter to the debtor, but if the debtor still does not comply then the creditor can take further action, namely through non-litigation and litigation methods.


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