Plea Bargaining Policy by the Prosecutor's Office in the Framework of Accelerating the Settlement of Corruption Crime Cases

Abstract

This study aims to determine, review and analyze the plea bargaining policy implemented by the Prosecutor's Office in handling corruption cases. Based on the study, it is concluded that the plea bargaining policy implemented by the Prosecutor's Office in handling corruption cases can be implemented if there is an agreement between the Public Prosecutor and the defendant or his legal counsel which results in an admission of guilt by the defendant, then the defendant has returned the state's financial losses and then the public prosecutor carries out a light prosecution/special minimum criminal threat and the judge decides the case as the lightest criminal threat/special minimum criminal threat. The impact of the implementation of the plea bargaining policy by the Prosecutor's Office in handling corruption cases has a positive and effective impact in accelerating the return of state financial losses, in the trial process it can also be carried out quickly, judges no longer conduct examinations in court (trial) and can immediately impose sentences, so that plea bargaining is considered cost effective and reduces the burden on the Prosecutor's Office and the Court (cheap and fast). Thus, the Prosecutor's Office should make regulations or Attorney General's Regulations (PERJA) concerning the procedures for implementing plea bargaining, considering that the implementation of plea bargaining has not been regulated in Law Number 16 of 2004 in conjunction with Law Number 11 of 2021 concerning the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia or in Law Number 31 of 1999 as amended by Law Number 20 of 2001 concerning the Eradication of Corruption.