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Constitutional Regulation of Party-Driven Recall and Democratic Accountability in Indonesia's Parliament

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Abstract. *This article critically examines party-driven recall in Indonesia's parliamentary system, situating it within constitutional law, representation theory, and democratic accountability. The study addresses growing concerns that recall mechanisms, rather than strengthening democracy, may reinforce party control over elected representatives. It aims to analyze how recall, regulated through statutory provisions and internal party rules, affects legislative independence and the balance between party sovereignty and popular sovereignty. Using a normative legal methodology, the research combines doctrinal analysis, comparative approaches, and legal hermeneutics. Primary sources include the 1945 Constitution, relevant legislation, party constitutions, and judicial decisions, enabling an evaluation of recall within Indonesia's asymmetric bicameral structure. The findings show that recall functions primarily as an instrument of party discipline rather than democratic accountability. Political parties use it to control legislators who deviate from party lines, thereby weakening parliamentary autonomy and shifting accountability away from constituents. This effect is intensified by the dominance of the People's Representative Council (DPR) and the interaction between statutory and party-based rules. The study concludes that Indonesia's recall system undermines representative democracy by prioritizing party sovereignty over voter accountability, highlighting the need for reforms aligned with democratic principles.*

Keywords: *Bicameralism; Democratic Representation; Legislative Accountability; Party Recall; Party Sovereignty.*

1. Introduction

Democratic governance is sustained by the ability of representative institutions to reflect the will of the people while ensuring accountability, legitimacy, and stability. In Indonesia, political parties have historically occupied a central role in shaping legislative representation, acting as the principal mediators between citizens and the state. This dynamic reflects a broader trend in comparative democracies, where parties serve as the essential conduits for aggregating societal interests into policymaking institutions (Pawane et al., 2023; Simatupang and Kokpan, 2023). Over the past decades, Indonesia's party system has undergone significant transformation, characterized by the decline of traditional Islamic parties and the emergence of pragmatic coalitions, which have altered both the structure of political competition and the quality of representation (Waluyo, 2021; Mahyudin, 2024). These changes underscore the complexity of legislative accountability in an environment where party dominance often determines the trajectory of democratic consolidation.

The theoretical underpinnings of political representation provide further insight into these challenges. Classical theories distinguish between trustee, delegate, and partisan models, each of which captures different aspects of legislative behavior. In Indonesia's proportional representation system, particularly under closed-list arrangements, the delegate model becomes increasingly relevant, as party organizations control candidate selection and determine the fate of parliamentary mandates (Purnama and Manitra, 2023). At the same time, the politico model, which emphasizes the fluid navigation of diverse voter preferences, has gained salience in Indonesia's fragmented and multiparty political landscape (Rahmanto et al., 2021; Asrinaldi and Abdul Karim, 2022). The interaction of these models with Indonesia's institutional arrangements points to a system in which parties, rather than constituents, exert primary influence over legislative outcomes. Consequently, understanding the role of political parties is essential for evaluating both the strengths and vulnerabilities of Indonesia's democratic system.

Despite their central role in democratic representation, parties in Indonesia have frequently been criticized for consolidating control at the expense of direct accountability to constituents. In proportional representation systems, party dominance often results in legislators prioritizing party loyalty over constituency engagement, thereby reducing the degree to which voters can hold individual representatives accountable (Abdullah and Karim, 2021; Salmah et al., 2021). This disconnects between representatives and their electorates undermines the principle of democratic accountability and creates a perception of distance between political elites and the public (Arif and Mamonto, 2024). Within this context, the mechanism of party-driven recall, or Interim replacement (*Pergantian Antar Waktu*/PAW), emerges as a particularly controversial instrument, granting parties the ability to

unilaterally replace sitting members of parliament under conditions often tied to party discipline rather than public interest (Haryani et al., 2022).

The principal research problem addressed in this study concerns the extent to which party-controlled recall undermines the constitutional quality of representation in Indonesia's parliament. Critics argue that such recall mechanisms are less about safeguarding democratic norms and more about reinforcing party hegemony within legislative processes. In particular, scholars highlight the risk that recall procedures prioritize internal stability and control rather than genuine representation of voter preferences (Donzelli, 2020; Pujiningsih et al., 2023). This critique is consistent with broader concerns that excessive party dominance erodes the sovereignty of the people as enshrined in Indonesia's Constitution, shifting accountability from constituents to party elites. Addressing this problem requires not only a doctrinal examination of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions but also a normative assessment of how such practices align or fail to align with democratic principles (Arif, 2021; Winstar, 2025).

The recall mechanism is further complicated by Indonesia's institutional context, particularly its bicameral legislative structure. Bicameralism in Indonesia comprises the People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*/DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*/DPD), bodies that possess asymmetric powers and overlapping but unequal roles in lawmaking (Murillo & Pinto, 2022). The DPR holds significant legislative authority, while the DPD functions primarily in an advisory capacity, a structure similar to weak bicameral systems such as those in France and Canada (Rohmah et al., 2024). Comparatively, Germany's Bundesrat represents regional interests but also lacks full legislative authority, reflecting broader patterns of constrained second chambers in modern democracies (Sudulich et al., 2020; Fernando & Susilowati, 2023). Within this institutional framework, recall powers amplify the imbalance between chambers by reinforcing DPR dominance and further centralizing authority within party structures.

Solutions to these democratic and institutional challenges have been proposed in both legal and ethical terms. Legally, proportional representation is often justified as enhancing accountability through the articulation of clear party platforms; however, it also restricts the responsiveness of individual legislators to their constituencies (Murillo and Pinto, 2022). Ethically, representatives are tasked with reconciling obligations to their voters with the need to maintain party cohesion, an equilibrium that is difficult to achieve without compromising one side of the equation. Scholars have therefore suggested reforms designed to strengthen personal accountability while maintaining the stabilizing role of parties, such as improving transparency in recall procedures, limiting grounds for dismissal, and enhancing judicial oversight (Blais, 2022; Mukhlis, 2024).

At the same time, the scholarly literature highlights both normative and practical deficiencies in the current recall system (Linetskyi, 2024). Empirical accounts of recall in Indonesia reveal that it is often employed not as a mechanism for enhancing accountability but as a tool for punishing dissent within party ranks. These practices not only weaken legislative autonomy but also diminish public trust in representative institutions. Comparative studies demonstrate that in many democracies, recall is a voter-driven process initiated through petitions and popular mobilization, whereas in Indonesia it is predominantly party-driven, raising fundamental concerns about its legitimacy and democratic validity (Donzelli, 2020; Pujiningsih et al., 2023). The contrast underscores the gap between the constitutional principle of popular sovereignty and the practical realities of party-controlled recall.

Although existing studies have examined party dominance, proportional representation, and the democratic implications of recall mechanisms, an important analytical gap remains concerning the normative design of recall that can reconcile party discipline with popular sovereignty (Mahyudin, 2024; Aflah & Hidayat, 2025). Previous studies have largely focused on the constitutional legitimacy of party-controlled recall and its implications for legislative accountability, while providing limited theoretical explanation of how competing institutional interests should be balanced through a coherent legal and institutional framework. This study addresses this gap by developing a normative framework for constitutionally bounded party recall, in which the disciplinary authority of political parties is recognized but constrained by democratic accountability, procedural fairness, and independent institutional oversight. The central argument is that neither unrestricted party control nor an exclusively voter-driven recall mechanism adequately addresses the institutional realities of Indonesia's proportional representation system. Instead, recall should operate through a structured mechanism that preserves party cohesion while preventing arbitrary termination of an electoral mandate. Accordingly, this study moves beyond identifying the tension between party sovereignty and popular sovereignty by formulating a reform framework that translates constitutional principles into specific legal safeguards and institutional arrangements.

The aim of this study is thus threefold: first, to examine the constitutional and statutory foundations of party-driven recall in Indonesia; second, to assess how the mechanism affects the relationship between party discipline, legislative independence, and democratic accountability; and third, to formulate a constitutionally grounded reform framework for balancing party authority with the sovereignty of the electorate. The principal novelty of this study lies in the development of a model of constitutionally bounded party recall, which integrates representative democracy, party institutionalization, and procedural fairness into a single normative framework. The model proposes that recall authority should remain available to political parties for legitimate disciplinary purposes but must be subject to clearly defined legal grounds, fair internal procedures, independent review, and

safeguards against arbitrary political retaliation. By translating these theoretical principles into legal and institutional reform proposals, this study contributes a prescriptive approach to the regulation of recall within Indonesia's proportional representation system. Its contribution therefore extends beyond doctrinal evaluation toward the formulation of institutional safeguards capable of reconciling organizational discipline with democratic legitimacy.

To address these issues, this study is guided by the following research questions:

1. How is the political party recall mechanism constitutionally regulated in Indonesia?
2. How does party-controlled recall affect democratic representation and legislative accountability?
3. What reforms are needed to balance party discipline with democratic accountability?

2. Research Methods

This study adopts a normative legal research design, which is particularly well-suited for evaluating constitutional law and mechanisms of political representation. Normative legal research is used to examine the doctrines, rules, and principles embedded within legal texts, allowing scholars to assess their coherence, consistency, and alignment with democratic ideals. In this research, the design emphasizes a doctrinal reading of the Indonesian Constitution, statutory provisions related to political parties, and internal party regulations on interim replacement (*Pergantian Antar Waktu*/PAW). The goal is to understand the extent to which these rules align with the principles of popular sovereignty and accountability.

The adoption of a normative design is justified by the fact that recall mechanisms are largely determined by statutory and party-based rules, which necessitate close analysis of legal texts. By situating the research within this framework, the study identifies how the law is written, how it has been interpreted, and how it operates in practice. This approach ensures that the conclusions are grounded in legal doctrine while also considering broader democratic principles.

This research uses doctrinal analysis whose main focus is interpreting and applying constitutional provisions and applicable laws and regulations to evaluate the alignment of these provisions with the principles of democratic representation. This method involves systematic analysis of Indonesia's 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945), the Political Party Law (Law No. 2/2011), and related legislation governing the DPR and DPD. Through this analysis, the study identifies ambiguities, contradictions, and weaknesses in the legal framework, particularly those that enable excessive party dominance over elected representatives. As Linetskyi (2024) emphasizes, doctrinal

analysis is critical for understanding both the textual meaning and normative implications of constitutional rules.

Apart from using doctrinal analysis, this research also uses normative analysis carried out through a prescriptive framework guided by theory. First, the existing legal framework governing party recall is examined to identify the scope of party authority and the constitutional safeguards applicable to elected representatives. Second, the identified legal arrangements are evaluated against the principles of democratic representation, party institutionalization, and procedural fairness. Third, the analysis identifies regulatory and institutional gaps that may enable arbitrary or disproportionate exercises of recall authority. Finally, these findings are translated into prescriptive proposals concerning statutory regulation, internal party procedures, and independent oversight. This analytical sequence enables the study to move beyond descriptive legal analysis toward the development of a normative reform framework that balances party discipline with democratic accountability.

Comparative analysis is guided by the functional approach to comparative law and the concept of legal transplant. The recall mechanisms of the United States and Switzerland are examined as comparative references for understanding how voter accountability is institutionally incorporated into recall procedures. Rather than treating these mechanisms as models for direct adoption, the analysis assesses the relevance and adaptability of their underlying principles within Indonesia's constitutional structure, proportional representation system, and party-centered regulation. Legal hermeneutics is used to interpret constitutional norms, statutory provisions, and party regulations in light of democratic accountability and popular sovereignty. Primary legal materials include the 1945 Constitution, relevant legislation, party constitutions (AD/ART), judicial decisions, and internal party documents governing recall procedures (Nurwahyu, 2022).

This study integrates normative evaluation, structural-functional assessment, and critical doctrinal review to examine Indonesia's party-driven recall mechanism within a constitutional democracy framework. It analyzes constitutional principles, institutional dynamics, and doctrinal debates using authoritative legal sources, including statutes and judicial decisions. Analytical rigor is ensured through consistent legal interpretation, while transparency and objectivity guide the research process.

3. Result and Discussion

3.1 Constitutional Regulation of Party Recall in Indonesia

The statutory underpinnings of party-driven recall in Indonesia are enshrined in Article 239(2) of Law Number 17/2014, which explicitly authorizes political parties to initiate the dismissal of members of the DPR. As discussed by Haryani et al. (2022) and Rahmawati Yunus (2025), this provision is emblematic of a legal framework that

privileges party sovereignty over the accountability of legislators to their constituencies. Rather than grounding legitimacy in popular consent, the law establishes party loyalty as the decisive criterion for maintaining legislative mandates. This construction creates an inherent tension between constitutional principles of sovereignty of the people (*kedaulatan rakyat*) and the practical mechanisms of representation.

The mechanism of recall is further reinforced by internal party instruments, namely the Articles of Association and Bylaws (AD/ART), which operationalize statutory mandates through detailed procedures for recall. Scholars such as Paul Blokker (2021) note that although AD/ART must formally align with national statutes, they effectively grant parties wide latitude in defining recallable offenses. This dual structure national laws conferring legitimacy and internal bylaws dictating practice creates a layered regulatory environment where parties exert near-total control over representatives. Suftyadi et al. (2023) emphasize that this hybrid framework produces ambiguity and undermines legal certainty, as recall procedures are vulnerable to expansive interpretation by party elites. The consequence is a system in which legislative tenure is precarious, with judicial review often reduced to a secondary, reactive instrument rather than a substantive safeguard.

The constitutional regulation of party recall should also be examined in relation to Indonesia's electoral system, which significantly shapes the legal relationship between political parties and elected representatives. Under the proportional representation system, political parties exercise substantial authority over candidate nomination, electoral endorsement, and parliamentary replacement, thereby reinforcing their institutional control throughout the legislative mandate. This legal design strengthens party cohesion but simultaneously reduces the autonomy of individual legislators, as their political continuity depends largely on party approval rather than direct electoral accountability (Simatupang & Kokpan, 2023). Furthermore, the central role of political parties in determining legislative representation reflects the constitutional architecture of Indonesia's representative democracy, where parties function as the primary channel of political participation while also influencing the composition of parliament (Rahmanto et al., 2021). Comparative studies further suggest that more balanced parliamentary systems generally distribute institutional authority through stronger legislative oversight and inter-chamber equilibrium, reducing the concentration of power within political organizations (Rohmah et al., 2024). Consequently, the constitutional regulation of recall should be interpreted not only as a disciplinary mechanism but also as an institutional arrangement that reflects the interaction between Indonesia's electoral design, parliamentary structure, and representative democracy (Mahendra, 2021; Purnama & Manitra, 2023;).

The constitutional regulation of party recall must also be understood within Indonesia's bicameral parliamentary system, which shapes the institutional framework in which recall is implemented. Indonesia's bicameral architecture is characterized by asymmetry and incongruence, with the House of Representatives (DPR) exercising broad legislative authority while the Regional Representative Council (DPD) performs primarily consultative and advisory functions with limited substantive influence. Fernando and Susilowati (2022) highlight that this imbalance restricts the DPD's capacity to effectively represent regional interests in national policymaking. Likewise, Thohir and Sukriono (2023) argue that Indonesia's incongruent bicameral structure creates institutional disparities that weaken representative inclusiveness. Consequently, the constitutional operation of recall cannot be separated from this broader institutional arrangement, since the mechanism is primarily exercised within the DPR, where legislative authority is concentrated.

Within this constitutional framework, the implementation of party recall is concentrated in the DPR, reflecting the distribution of legislative authority established by Indonesia's bicameral system (Noor et al., 2023; Mahyudin, 2024). Because the DPR monopolizes legislative power, recall mechanisms disproportionately affect this chamber, reinforcing its centrality while sidelining the DPD. The outcome is a concentration of institutional authority that magnifies the influence of political parties, as DPR members remain subject to continuous oversight and disciplinary measures imposed by party leadership. Meanwhile, the DPD's limited constitutional role leaves it with little capacity to counterbalance this concentration of authority. Consequently, Indonesia's asymmetric bicameral structure provides the institutional setting in which party-controlled recall operates, reinforcing the dominant position of political parties within parliamentary governance.

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the regulation of party recall in Indonesia is not confined to statutory provisions alone but is embedded within a broader constitutional and institutional framework that combines national legislation, internal party regulations, and the structure of Indonesia's bicameral parliament. While Law Number 17 of 2014 provides the formal legal basis for the Interim replacement (*Pergantian Antar Waktu*/PAW) mechanism, its implementation is substantially influenced by political parties through their internal governance and disciplinary rules (Haryani et al., 2022). At the same time, the asymmetric distribution of legislative authority between the DPR and the DPD reinforces the concentration of recall within the chamber where political parties exercise the greatest institutional influence. Accordingly, the constitutional framework governing party recall reflects a legal design that places political parties at the center of legislative mandate control, thereby answering the first research question concerning how party recall is regulated under Indonesia's constitutional framework.

2. Implications of Party-Controlled Recall for Democratic Representation and Accountability

The implications of party-controlled recall become evident in parliamentary practice, where recall has increasingly functioned less as a democratic safeguard than as a disciplinary instrument wielded by party leadership. Suftyadi et al. (2023) demonstrate that recalls are frequently invoked when legislators diverge from party positions on high-stakes policy issues, reinforcing a culture of compliance within parliamentary caucuses. Mukhlis (2024) argue persuasively that such practices reveal the oligarchic character of Indonesian political parties, wherein party elites prioritize organizational cohesion and strategic leverage over responsiveness to citizens.

The dominance of political parties in exercising recall authority has significant consequences for legislative behavior and democratic accountability. As Mukhlis (2024) documents, party control narrows the space for independent deliberation and reduces MPs' willingness to exercise discretion in contentious debates. This results in unreflective voting patterns that advance party agendas at the expense of constituency representation. The chilling effect extends beyond voting: legislators often engage in self-censorship during deliberations to avoid triggering disciplinary proceedings. Such practices erode the deliberative quality of the DPR, transforming it into a body that functions primarily as an extension of party leadership. The constitutional principle of popular sovereignty is thus supplanted in practice by what may be termed party sovereignty, a dynamic that raises profound normative questions about the legitimacy of parliamentary representation (Murillo & Pinto, 2022).

Beyond its institutional consequences, party-controlled recall also affects the quality of democratic representation by weakening the representative relationship between legislators and citizens. Representatives who face the constant possibility of recall are more likely to prioritize party directives over constituency interests, reducing their capacity to exercise independent political judgment. As a result, legislative representation shifts from a citizen-oriented model toward an organization-centered model in which accountability is directed primarily to political parties. Comparative parliamentary studies further demonstrate that effective representation depends not only on electoral legitimacy but also on the ability of legislators to deliberate independently while remaining responsive to public preferences (Sudulich et al., 2020; Aflah & Hidayat, 2025). This imbalance may also contribute to declining public confidence in representative institutions, as citizens perceive parliamentary decisions as reflecting internal party interests rather than the broader public interest. In the long term, excessive party dominance through recall mechanisms may weaken democratic legitimacy by fostering political dependency, reducing institutional transparency, and increasing the risk of governance practices that are vulnerable to

elite capture and corruption (Salmah et al., 2021; Suftyadi et al., 2023; Thohir & Sukriono, 2023).

The broader implications of these findings reveal a systemic imbalance within Indonesia's democratic framework. Statutory mandates and internal party regulations operate in tandem to entrench party hegemony (Pujiningsih et al., 2023). Recall is deployed primarily to enforce loyalty rather than to promote accountability. Bicameral asymmetry accentuates these dynamics by consolidating power within the DPR. Comparative evidence situates Indonesia as an outlier, privileging party over voter control. Collectively, these dynamics illustrate a structural disjuncture between the constitutional ideal of popular sovereignty and the lived reality of party sovereignty.

These implications can be observed from doctrinal, normative, institutional, and comparative perspectives. From a doctrinal standpoint, the fusion of statutory authority with party bylaws creates a closed system in which parties enjoy near-monopolistic control over legislative mandates (Pawane et al., 2023). Normatively, this prioritization of party discipline undermines the ethos of representative democracy, reducing legislators to agents of party elites. Institutionally, bicameral asymmetry deprives the system of meaningful checks and balances, further entrenching centralization. Comparatively, Indonesia’s divergence from participatory recall models underscores the fragility of its accountability mechanisms. The synthesis of these perspectives indicates that without reform, the recall system will remain a source of democratic erosion rather than renewal.

The implications identified in this study extend beyond the operation of recall itself and reflect broader constitutional, ethical, institutional, and comparative concerns within Indonesia's democratic system. Constitutionally, these findings reveal persistent tensions between the constitutional guarantee of popular sovereignty and the practical reality of party-dominated governance (Pawane et al., 2023). Ethically, they demonstrate how representatives may prioritize loyalty to party elites over responsiveness to their constituents, thereby weakening democratic accountability. Institutionally, Indonesia's asymmetric bicameral structure reinforces political centralization while limiting effective checks and balances within the legislative process. From a comparative perspective, the findings further suggest that recall mechanisms can function as democratic safeguards only when they are designed to promote accountability to citizens rather than organizational control by political parties.

Overall, the findings demonstrate that party-controlled recall has significant implications for democratic representation and legislative accountability in Indonesia. Although constitutionally intended to maintain political responsibility within representative institutions, its implementation has increasingly shifted accountability away from the electorate and toward political party leadership. This

transformation weakens the representative function of members of parliament by limiting their independence in legislative decision-making and reducing their responsiveness to constituents. At the institutional level, the interaction between party dominance and Indonesia's legislative structure further reinforces centralized political control, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of representative democracy. These findings indicate that the current recall mechanism operates not only as a legal instrument of parliamentary replacement but also as a structural factor influencing the quality of democratic governance and constitutional accountability in Indonesia.

3. Reforming Indonesia's Recall Mechanism to Strengthen Democratic Governance

Comparative constitutional practices provide important guidance for reforming Indonesia's party recall mechanism and strengthening democratic governance. International comparison underscores the distinctiveness and democratic fragility of Indonesia’s recall model. In several U.S. states, recall is initiated through voter petitions, with specified thresholds of signatures leading to popular elections that determine whether officials remain in office. Switzerland’s cantonal systems similarly empower citizens to demand recall elections, embedding accountability directly in participatory mechanisms. In Latin America, Venezuela provides a constitutional basis for recall referenda, allowing citizens to terminate mandates after a designated period of service (Fernando & Susilowati, 2023).

These comparative practices demonstrate that recall is fundamentally intended to function as a participatory mechanism through which citizens hold their elected representatives accountable. By contrast, Indonesia’s party-centered recall subverts this logic, consolidating disciplinary powers in the hands of party elites and marginalizing the role of voters (Murillo & Pinto, 2022; Mukhlis, 2024). Comparative insights thus illuminate the normative divergence between Indonesia and established democratic practices, illustrating how institutional design can either reinforce or erode democratic legitimacy. Donzelli (2020) contends that Indonesia’s recall provisions run counter to democratic principles by embedding oligarchic control within the legislature. Comparative evidence demonstrates that when recall mechanisms are grounded in citizen participation, they can enhance transparency and responsiveness; when monopolized by parties, they devolve into instruments of control. These comparative insights suggest that reforming Indonesia's recall mechanism should not merely focus on procedural adjustments but also on restoring the constitutional principle that democratic legitimacy ultimately derives from the people rather than political organizations. From the perspective of legal transplant, these foreign models should not be adopted wholesale, since their operation depends on distinct constitutional and electoral arrangements. Their relevance lies instead in identifying accountability principles that may be adapted to Indonesia’s legal context, particularly through clearer recall grounds, procedural safeguards, and meaningful public accountability.

Drawing upon the preceding constitutional and comparative analysis, this study argues that reforming Indonesia's party-driven recall mechanism requires a normative framework that reconciles party discipline with democratic accountability (Linetskyi, 2024). From the perspective of representative democracy, elected legislators remain accountable to the electorate whose mandate legitimizes their representation. At the same time, political parties perform an essential institutional function by maintaining organizational cohesion and collective political responsibility. The central problem therefore lies not in the existence of party disciplinary authority, but in the absence of adequate constraints on its exercise. Accordingly, this study proposes that recall authority should be retained as a legitimate instrument of party discipline while being subject to clearly defined statutory grounds, transparent internal procedures, independent review, and safeguards against arbitrary or politically motivated decisions. These measures reflect the principles of procedural fairness and constitutional accountability, ensuring that disciplinary decisions are proportionate and consistent with democratic representation. Such a framework would preserve the institutional role of political parties while preventing party sovereignty from displacing the constitutional principle of popular sovereignty. The contribution of this framework lies in reconceptualizing party recall as a constitutionally bounded disciplinary power that preserves the institutional role of political parties while protecting the democratic mandate of elected representatives.

Effective recall reform also requires strengthening constitutional safeguards to ensure that legislative accountability is not determined solely by internal party discretion. Beyond statutory amendments, the Constitutional Court should continue to play a more active role in reviewing recall provisions that potentially conflict with the constitutional principles of popular sovereignty, equality before the law, and representative democracy. Judicial oversight would provide an important constitutional check against arbitrary recall decisions while ensuring that political parties exercise their disciplinary authority within clearly defined legal limits (Thohir & Sukriono, 2023). At the same time, reforms should encourage greater transparency in internal party decision-making by requiring objective procedures, written justifications, and accessible review mechanisms before recall decisions become effective. Such measures would enhance procedural fairness without eliminating the legitimate role of political parties in maintaining organizational discipline (Yunus, 2025). Moreover, increasing public demand for accountable representation demonstrates that democratic legitimacy increasingly depends on openness, responsiveness, and public trust rather than unconditional party control (Waluyo, 2021).

In sum, the study underscores that Indonesia's recall system, as currently constituted, entrenches party hegemony at the expense of democratic accountability. The reform agenda it necessitates is not merely technical but foundational, aimed at realigning

the architecture of representation with the constitutional promise of popular sovereignty. Only through such recalibration can Indonesia ensure that recall serves as a safeguard of democracy rather than a mechanism of oligarchic control. Overall, the findings suggest that strengthening Indonesia's recall mechanism requires reforms that balance political party discipline with the constitutional principles of popular sovereignty and democratic accountability. Comparative constitutional practices demonstrate that recall is more likely to reinforce democratic governance when citizens are actively involved in the accountability process and when independent institutions provide effective oversight over dismissal procedures. Accordingly, reform efforts should not be limited to revising statutory provisions but should also strengthen institutional safeguards, improve transparency in party decision-making, and enhance public participation within the constitutional framework. Such reforms would preserve the legitimate role of political parties while ensuring that recall operates as a democratic safeguard that protects representative government rather than as an instrument of organizational control.

4. Conclusion

This study demonstrates that Indonesia's party-driven recall mechanism operates not merely as a legal procedure but as a constitutional arrangement that reinforces political party dominance over legislative representation. The findings show that the interaction between statutory regulations and internal party rules enables political parties to exercise extensive control over parliamentary mandates, thereby shifting accountability from the electorate to party elites. Furthermore, Indonesia's asymmetric bicameral structure amplifies these effects by concentrating the consequences of recall within the DPR, where legislative authority is predominantly exercised. Comparative analysis indicates that Indonesia differs from jurisdictions that incorporate voter participation into recall procedures, highlighting the need to rebalance party discipline with democratic accountability.

The study contributes theoretically by conceptualizing party recall as a form of disciplinary power that must be constitutionally bounded to preserve the institutional role of political parties while protecting the democratic mandate of elected representatives. By integrating doctrinal, normative, and comparative constitutional perspectives, it explains how recall mechanisms shape political representation, institutional balance, and democratic accountability. The comparative findings further suggest that foreign recall models should not be transplanted wholesale, as their operation depends on distinct constitutional and electoral arrangements. Instead, their underlying accountability principles may be adapted to Indonesia's legal and political context.

Practically, the findings provide a basis for policymakers to reconsider the current recall framework so that it better reflects the constitutional principle of popular sovereignty while preserving the legitimate role of political parties within Indonesia's

representative democracy. Accordingly, reforms should establish clearer and more transparent statutory grounds for recall, strengthen independent oversight of recall decisions, and consider appropriate forms of public participation in the accountability process. Future research should complement this doctrinal analysis with empirical investigations of how recall practices affect legislative behaviour, party discipline, public trust, and electoral accountability across different political contexts.

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