

The Dynamics of the DPR's Checks and Balances Supervision in the Law Enforcement Process: Challenges and Potential for Political Intervention from a Constitutional Law Perspective

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Abstract. *This study aims to analyze the dynamics of the House of Representatives' oversight function within the framework of checks and balances on the law enforcement process in Indonesia, considering that although the House of Representatives constitutionally has oversight authority, in practice this authority often conflicts with the principle of judicial independence. This study uses a normative juridical method with a statutory and conceptual approach to comprehensively examine the relationship between the legislative oversight function and the law enforcement process. The results of the study indicate that the oversight mechanism implemented through Public Hearings (RDP) and Special Committees (Pansus) has a high level of vulnerability to political intervention, which ultimately has the potential to degrade objectivity and impartiality in law enforcement. The main problem found lies in the blurring of the boundaries between oversight of law enforcement policies and intervention in the technical aspects of case handling, thus creating tension between the legislative control function and the principle of judicial independence. Therefore, this study recommends the need for a more firm and measurable redefinition of the operational boundaries of the House of Representatives' oversight function, in order to align with the principles of a rule of law state that upholds the supremacy of law and ensures impartiality in every law enforcement process in Indonesia.*

Keywords: *Balances; Checks; Enforcement; Intervention; Law.*

1. Introduction

Indonesia, as a state based on the rule of law (*rechtstaat*), adopts the principle of division of power, manifested through a mechanism of checks and balances, as the main foundation for democratic and just governance. This principle requires a

balance of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government to prevent the concentration of power in any one branch, which could potentially lead to abuse of power. From a constitutional law perspective, oversight between state institutions is not merely an accessory to democracy, but rather a vital instrument for ensuring the accountability of every holder of public authority and ensuring that all state policies and actions remain within the framework of the constitution and applicable law. (Asshiddiqie, J, 2021). The oversight function carried out by legislative institutions, particularly the House of Representatives (DPR), is a crucial element in maintaining transparency and accountability in government performance, including in the law enforcement sector. However, in Indonesian constitutional practice, the synergy between the legislative oversight function and the independence of law enforcement often creates complex constitutional tensions, particularly when such oversight has the potential to enter the technical realm of case handling, which should be free from political interference. This tension indicates an unclear boundary between legitimate democratic control and potential intervention that could undermine the principle of judicial independence, thus raising the need for the formulation of firmer and more proportional boundaries in the practice of checks and balances in Indonesia.

The House of Representatives (DPR) has a constitutional mandate, as stipulated in Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution, to carry out three main functions: legislation, budgeting, and oversight, which are designed to maintain the balance of power within the Indonesian constitutional system. In the context of law enforcement, the DPR's oversight function is directed at ensuring that law enforcement institutions such as the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) exercise their authority within the framework of statutory regulations, the principle of due process of law, and respect for human rights. Through instruments such as Public Hearings (RDP), the right of interpellation, the right of inquiry, and the right to express an opinion, the DPR has the space to evaluate the policies, performance, and accountability of law enforcement institutions in carrying out their duties. This oversight is an essential element in a presidential system, given the strong position of the executive, which structurally oversees most law enforcement institutions. Therefore, an effective control mechanism is needed to prevent abuse of power or arbitrary actions. However, the implementation of this supervisory function must also continue to pay attention to constitutional boundaries so that it does not shift into a form of intervention against the independence of the law enforcement process, especially in the technical realm of handling cases which demands objectivity and freedom from political influence (Simamora, J., 2022).

One of the main pillars of law enforcement is ensuring the independence of judicial authorities and law enforcement officials from all forms of external influence, particularly political intervention that could potentially obscure the objectivity of the legal process. An independent judiciary is an absolute prerequisite for impartial

justice, where every decision is based solely on the law and the facts of the trial without pressure from any force. Within the framework of a state based on the rule of law, this independence is not only normative but must also be concretely realized in institutional practices and legal culture. However, various studies have shown that the line between political oversight by parliament and intervention in ongoing legal processes is often blurred and difficult to measure precisely ((Gaffar, JM, 2023). This unclear boundary creates a gray area that allows the oversight function to be misused as a tool of political pressure, either directly or indirectly, against law enforcement officials. Consequently, this situation has the potential to damage the dignity of law enforcement, which should be free from the pragmatic interests of political parties, while also eroding public trust in the integrity and independence of the Indonesian judicial system.

In recent years, the House of Representatives' (DPR) involvement in responding to certain legal cases through public hearings (RDPs) has frequently come under scrutiny, perceived as exceeding the boundaries of policy oversight, which should be macro- and institutional-level. Rather than focusing on evaluating the performance and accountability of law enforcement agencies, the emerging practice tends to delve into the technical aspects of handling ongoing cases. This phenomenon is often referred to as "parliamentary trials," where legislators openly apply verbal pressure, harsh criticism, and even direct questions to investigators and prosecutors. Such conditions not only create tensions between state institutions but also have the potential to blur the line between legitimate oversight and interventions that could undermine the independence of the legal process.

This kind of political intervention has serious implications for the quality and legitimacy of law enforcement itself. In practice, pressure arising in political forums such as the Hearing (RDP) can prematurely shape public opinion, even before the legal process reaches the stage of comprehensive evidence in court. This has the potential to influence public perception and put psychological pressure on law enforcement officials in making decisions. This condition can undermine legal legitimacy because the decision-making process is no longer entirely based on material evidence and the principle of due process of law, but is instead influenced by the dynamics and configuration of evolving political forces (Isra, S., 2024). If left unchecked, this kind of practice will not only undermine the principle of judicial independence but also threaten the foundations of the rule of law, which upholds objective and impartial justice.

Regulatory-wise, the MD3 Law does provide ample scope for the DPR to summon anyone for oversight purposes. However, the lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs) that limit what can and cannot be questioned during law enforcement creates a loophole for abuse of authority. Without clear demarcation, the oversight function is transformed into an instrument for protecting the

interests of political elites embroiled in legal issues. Huda, N., 2025). This creates a bad precedent for the climate of legal supremacy in Indonesia.

Given these challenges, a comprehensive reevaluation of the implementation of the principle of checks and balances in the relationship between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government is necessary, particularly in the area of law enforcement. This evaluation is crucial given the dynamics of state administration practices, which indicate a tendency to broaden the meaning of oversight, potentially exceeding its constitutional limits. Therefore, the restructuring of the DPR's oversight mechanism must be directed more firmly at the managerial aspects, institutional governance, and macro-policies of law enforcement institutions, such as the formulation of law enforcement strategies, budget allocation, and institutional performance evaluation, rather than the technical aspects of handling ongoing cases (sub judice), which require complete independence from external intervention. Clarity of these boundaries is crucial to maintaining the balance between the function of democratic oversight and the principle of independent law enforcement.

Within this framework, this journal aims to deeply examine the ideal oversight formulation so that the DPR can continue to carry out its oversight function effectively without sacrificing the independence of law enforcement as the main foundation of a democratic state. The analysis will focus on formulating more precise operational boundaries, including strengthening legal norms and institutional ethics that can serve as guidelines in oversight practices. Furthermore, it will examine how institutional design and oversight instruments can be optimized to prevent the misuse of their functions as tools of political pressure. Thus, it is hoped that a proportional and constitutional oversight model can be found (Safa'at, MA, 2025). so that a healthy synergy is created between public accountability and the independence of law enforcement in the Indonesian constitutional system.

2. Research Methods

This research uses a normative juridical legal research method, namely legal research that positions law as a structure of norms that includes principles, systematics, and the level of synchronization of laws and regulations related to the parliamentary oversight function. The approach used is a statute approach to dissect the constitutional legitimacy of the DPR in Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution and technical regulations in the MD3 Law, as well as a conceptual approach to build theoretical arguments regarding the limits of political intervention on the independence of judicial power (judicial independence). Through this method, the researcher seeks to find a solution to the legal problem of the blurring of the demarcation between institutional macro policy supervision and technical intervention in sub-judice cases. The data sources used consist of primary legal materials, including the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of

Indonesia, the Law on Amendments to Law Number 17 of 2014 concerning MD3, and internal regulations of the DPR; and secondary legal materials that include legal literature, scientific journals, and Constitutional Court decisions relevant to the principle of checks and balances. The legal material collection technique was conducted through library research, systematically reviewing legal documents. The collected legal material was then analyzed using qualitative descriptive analysis methods with a deductive thinking pattern, namely drawing conclusions from general premises regarding the theory of the rule of law to specific facts regarding the dynamics of DPR oversight, resulting in recommendations for an ideal and constitutional oversight formulation.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1. Constitutional Ambiguity Regarding the Limits of DPR Oversight of Law Enforcement Institutions

Theoretically, the DPR's supervisory function is a direct manifestation of the principle of popular sovereignty which places parliament as a representation of the public will in ensuring that the executive branch of power does not abuse its authority (Janpatar Simamora, 2022). In the context of a democratic state based on law, this supervision is an important instrument for maintaining accountability, transparency, and government compliance with the constitution and laws and regulations (The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, especially Article 1 paragraph (3) and the principles of the rule of law). In the realm of law enforcement, the DPR through Commission III has a strategic role with the authority to summon and request information from working partners such as the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and other law enforcement agencies through the Hearing Meeting (RDP) forum, in order to evaluate performance and ensure that the law enforcement process is carried out in accordance with the principles of due process of law and respect for human rights (Law Number 17 of 2014 concerning the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD (MD3 Law) as last amended by Law Number 13 of 2019, specifically regarding the DPR's supervisory function and the authority of the Commission). However, the constitutional basis regulated in Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution basically only provides a general framework regarding the supervisory function without being accompanied by rigid and detailed material limitations regarding the extent to which such supervision can touch on the substance of ongoing legal cases (Simamora, J., 2022). This ambiguity then opens up wide room for interpretation in practice, which often results in overlap between the legitimate supervisory function and the potential for intervention in the law enforcement process, especially when the DPR enters the technical area of handling cases that should be within the domain of the independence of law enforcement officers (2023).

The ambiguity of these boundaries ultimately creates a very broad scope for interpretation for legislative members in carrying out their supervisory function,

thus opening up the opportunity for the expansion of the meaning of supervision outside the proper corridor (Huda, N., 2025). In practice, the pretext of "public interest" or "sociological aspects" is often used as justification to explore and even question the technical aspects of investigations and prosecutions in certain cases, which are actually within the realm of independent law enforcement officers. This condition indicates a shift from policy-based oversight to oversight that touches on the operational realm of cases (case handling), which has the potential to disrupt the objectivity of the legal process. From a constitutional law perspective, this phenomenon triggers quite serious tension between the oversight rights of parliament as a representation of the sovereignty of the people and the principle of judicial independence which demands that every legal process be carried out freely, impartially, and free from all forms of external pressure (Isra, S., 2025). If not clearly regulated, this situation not only has the potential to cause conflict between state institutions but can also erode the principle of the rule of law itself which places the supremacy of law as the main foundation in the exercise of power.

Ideal oversight within a democratic rule of law should focus on managerial aspects, budget management, and macro-institutional policies related to the performance and accountability of law enforcement agencies, rather than intervening in the technical process of case handling. In this context, the House of Representatives (DPR) has the legitimacy to question the effectiveness of budget absorption in case handling, the quality of public services in institutions such as the Police and the Prosecutor's Office, and even evaluate strategic policies taken by law enforcement agency leaders. This type of oversight actually strengthens the principle of accountability without compromising the independence of the legal process. However, problems arise when the subject of oversight shifts to more technical areas, such as questioning the basis for naming someone a suspect, delving into the construction of a case, or even requesting the presentation of evidence in political forums such as Public Hearings. This shift not only indicates a disproportionate expansion of the oversight function but also marks an overstepping of constitutional boundaries that should be maintained within the system of checks and balances (Asshiddiqie, Jimly. 2023). From the perspective of the doctrine of separation of powers, such actions have the potential to disrupt the independence of law enforcement officers and create political pressure on the judicial process, which in the end could damage the integrity and objectivity of law enforcement which should be free from external influence.

The implication of this ambiguity in the boundaries of oversight is the emergence of the phenomenon of "parliamentary trials," which in practice often precede or even overshadow the judicial process, which should be the sole forum for determining someone's guilt or innocence. In the Public Hearing (RDP) forum, statements by legislative members that are speculative, tendentious, or even lead to premature judgments about a case are often broadcast widely through mass

media and digital platforms, quickly shaping public opinion. This formed opinion often creates psychological pressure on investigators, public prosecutors, and other related parties, which ultimately can affect their independence and objectivity in carrying out the legal process. Furthermore, this condition has the potential to shift the locus of legal judgment from the courtroom, which should be neutral and based on evidence, to political spaces fraught with interests, perceptions, and calculations of power (Isra, Saldi., 2024).

Such a situation seriously jeopardizes the presumption of innocence, a fundamental principle of modern criminal law and a guarantee of human rights protection. When someone is "tried" based on public opinion due to political statements that are not necessarily based on the full legal facts, the objective judicial process is distorted before it even begins. Furthermore, this phenomenon can also undermine public trust in the judicial system, as people tend to perceive that the outcome of a case is not entirely determined by a fair legal process, but also by political pressures and dynamics developing outside the courts. (Fajar, M., & Achmad, Y., 2023). Therefore, without strict limitations and strong enforcement of institutional ethics, the practice of "parliamentary courts" has the potential to continue to develop and erode the principles of the rule of law which uphold justice, objectivity, and impartiality in every law enforcement process.

In a review of Law Number 17 of 2014 concerning the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD (MD3 Law) and its amendments, the DPR's authority in carrying out its supervisory function is indeed designed to be very strong, including the right to forcibly summon related parties to provide information in an official parliamentary forum (Maruarar Siahaan, 2023). This legal authority is essentially intended to strengthen accountability and transparency in government administration, particularly in ensuring that state institutions, including law enforcement officials, operate in accordance with their constitutional mandate. However, if this broad authority is not balanced with firm ethical boundaries and clear operational guidelines, it has the potential to transform into an instrument of pressure and even intimidation against law enforcement officials. (Then Muhammad Syarif, 2022). In practice, law enforcement institutions such as the Police and the Prosecutor's Office are often in a dilemma, on the one hand being required to maintain professionalism, independence, and integrity in the investigation and prosecution process, but on the other hand being faced with political expectations from legislative institutions that have a significant role in determining budget allocations and institutional support. This dilemma creates the potential for unhealthy conflicts of interest, where non-legal considerations can influence legal decision-making, ultimately risking eroding the principle of independence of law enforcement and weakening public trust in the justice system as a whole (Bagir Manan & Kurniati, 2021).

It is important to understand that law enforcement institutions such as the Police and the Prosecutor's Office are organically within the executive branch of power,

but their functions in practice have a judicial character, particularly in the investigation and prosecution processes that demand high independence and objectivity. This dualism of position often creates confusion in institutional understanding, especially among parliamentarians who view both institutions merely as working partners of the executive branch subject to full political control mechanisms. As a result, the assumption arises that every operational detail, including technical steps in handling cases, can be and is legitimately monitored and even intervened through political instruments (Zainal Arifin Mochtar, 2022). In fact, from the perspective of a state based on the rule of law (*rechtstaat*), there is a clear demarcation between administrative accountability and judicial independence, where the law enforcement process must be carried out free from external pressure, including from political power. This misunderstanding has the potential to blur the line between legitimate oversight and unconstitutional intervention, thus compromising the integrity of the legal process and weakening the principle of impartiality. Therefore, strengthening institutional understanding and affirming functional boundaries are crucial to maintaining the independence of law enforcement as a key pillar in ensuring justice and legal certainty in Indonesia.

Comparisons with developed countries show that parliaments generally have very strict regulatory mechanisms regarding the principle of *sub judice*, which prohibits members of the legislature from discussing or influencing cases currently under legal proceedings. This rule is usually reinforced through a parliamentary code of ethics and oversight by an independent ethics committee, so that any violations can be subject to strict sanctions, ranging from reprimands to restrictions on parliamentary activities. The goal is to maintain the integrity of the judicial process and ensure that the oversight function does not become a tool for political pressure on law enforcement officials. In contrast to this practice, in Indonesia, regulations regarding the limits of *sub judice* in the context of DPR oversight are still relatively fluid and have not been firmly institutionalized in binding norms. As a result, there is no clear and effective sanction mechanism for members of the legislature who blatantly intervene in specific cases through official parliamentary forums, such as Public Hearings. This situation not only opens up room for abuse of the oversight function but also has the potential to undermine the independence of law enforcement and undermine public trust in the judicial system and the legislative institution itself.

Therefore, operational redefinition of Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution and further regulations in the MD3 Law are an urgent need to address the blurring of boundaries between the supervisory function and potential intervention in law enforcement (The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Article 20A; Law Number 17 of 2014 concerning the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD (MD3 Law) as last amended by Law Number 13 of 2019). This effort is not only related to the formulation of firmer norms, but also includes harmonization between laws and

regulations so that the checks and balances mechanism can run effectively, proportionally, and remain in line with the principles of the rule of law (Jimly Asshiddiqie, 2022). Oversight by the House of Representatives (DPR) needs to be consistently directed at aspects of institutional accountability, such as policy evaluation, organizational performance, and budget management of law enforcement agencies, rather than at efforts to interfere with the functional independence of officers in handling ongoing cases. This assertion of boundaries is crucial to prevent the abuse of oversight authority as a tool of political pressure, while also maintaining the integrity of the legal process so that it remains based on the principles of objectivity, impartiality, and due process of law (Barda Nawawi Arief, 2021). Thus, this reformulation is expected to be able to create a healthy balance between the need for democratic control and protection of the independence of law enforcement as the main foundation of the Indonesian constitutional system.

3.2. Potential for Political Intervention and Degradation of Law Enforcement Impartiality

Political intervention in law enforcement through parliamentary mechanisms is a serious latent threat to the upholding of the rule of law in Indonesia, because it opens up space for the entry of non-juridical interests into a process that should be objective and independent (Siti Aisyah, 2023). When political interests begin to influence the direction and dynamics of case handling, the law is no longer positioned as a neutral instrument of justice, but instead shifts to become a political bargaining tool that is full of power interests (Nabila Rahmawati, 2023). In such circumstances, legal decisions risk no longer being based solely on facts and legal norms, but also being influenced by the prevailing configuration of political power. The potential for this distortion is even greater in cases directly affecting political elites, public officials, or national strategic policies, where political pressure tends to be stronger and more intense. Consequently, the independence of law enforcement officials can be eroded, the judicial process loses its integrity, and public trust in the legal system can significantly decline, as the perception arises that the law can be manipulated to suit the interests of certain parties.

These intervention practices are often subtle (soft intervention) but have a destructive impact on the integrity of law enforcement, because they do not always come in the form of explicit direct instructions, but rather through more subtle and systemic pressure mechanisms (Sigid Suseno, 2022). These practices can take the form of verbal pressure during openly broadcast hearings (RDPs), the formation of special committees (Pansus) that politically target specific cases, and implicit signals such as threats of budget cuts or institutional evaluations directed at law enforcement institutions. While seemingly legitimate oversight functions, these practices can actually create significant psychological stress for law enforcement officials, particularly when they are faced with crucial decisions in a

case. (Siti Aisyah, 2023). In such situations, independence and objectivity can potentially be distorted by non-legal considerations, such as concerns about the political or institutional impact of decisions. As a result, the law enforcement process no longer operates entirely based on the principle of due process of law, but is instead influenced by power dynamics that develop outside the legal framework, which can ultimately undermine public trust in the judicial system and undermine the principle of the rule of law itself.

The degradation of impartiality in law enforcement occurs when law enforcement officials no longer base every *pro justitia* action solely on legal facts and statutory provisions, but instead begin to consider the "political risks" that may arise from the decisions they make. In conditions such as these, the independence that should be the main foundation of law enforcement is slowly eroded by external pressures, both direct and indirect, so that the space for objectivity becomes increasingly narrow. When an investigator, public prosecutor, or other official feels that legal action against a particular individual, especially one close to the political elite or the leadership of a legislative institution, could impact their career, position, or even professional security, then the legal decisions taken have the potential to be distorted (Nabila Rahmawati, 2023). This situation creates a serious dilemma between carrying out legal obligations professionally and considering non-legal consequences that can be detrimental to both individuals and institutions. As a result, the principle of equality before the law, which guarantees that everyone is treated equally before the law, is threatened with collapse, because the application of the law is no longer universal and consistent (Siti Aisyah, 2023). In practice, the law then risks appearing sharply discriminatory against groups in society who lack political power or protection, but becomes blunt when dealing with parties who have access to power. If this condition continues, it will not only damage the integrity of law enforcement officials, but also erode the legitimacy of the justice system as a whole, because the public will view the law as no longer functioning as an instrument of justice, but rather as a tool that can be influenced and negotiated by certain political interests (M. Fajrul Falaakh, 2022).

This phenomenon is further exacerbated by the dominant party system in Indonesian politics, where members of the House of Representatives (DPR) often prioritize adherence to faction instructions or party lines over purely fulfilling their representative function as representatives of the people. In this context, partisan political orientation often shifts objectivity in carrying out the oversight function, so that oversight of law enforcement institutions is no longer neutral and based on the public interest, but is instead influenced by short-term political interests. As a result, the emerging oversight pattern tends to be inconsistent, being harsh and aggressive toward parties perceived as political opponents, but becoming lenient and accommodating when dealing with parties close to or within the ruling coalition. Such practices not only create double standards in enforcing

accountability but also have the potential to affect the direction and independence of the legal process as a whole. In the long term, this condition violates citizens' constitutional right to equality before the law, because the law is no longer enforced fairly and impartially, but is potentially influenced by the existing configuration of political power. This simultaneously erodes public trust in legislative institutions and the judicial system, and weakens the foundation of the rule of law, which is supposed to guarantee justice without discrimination.

The potential for political intervention not only arises during the oversight process of ongoing cases, but can also be detected early on through the selection mechanism for law enforcement agency leaders, which involves the House of Representatives (DPR), particularly in the fit and proper test. Normatively, this mechanism is part of the legislative oversight function to ensure that prospective leaders possess adequate capacity, integrity, and track records. However, in practice, this process often raises concerns about political compromise or even hidden "political contracts" between candidates and parliamentary factions. The political dynamics of the selection process are often not fully transparent, opening up space for non-meritocratic considerations that could potentially undermine the original purpose of the selection process.

The impact of these conditions can persist after a candidate is elected and takes office, where independence in carrying out duties becomes vulnerable to being influenced by political burdens inherent since the election process. The potential for "political debts" to supporting factions in the House of Representatives (DPR) can create implicit pressure on decision-making, especially when dealing with cases with political dimensions. This situation risks restricting the freedom of action of officials who should be independent, so that decisions are no longer based entirely on the principles of law and justice, but also consider the potential political consequences. In the long term, this can undermine the integrity of law enforcement institutions and erode public trust in the selection process and performance of institutions that should be run professionally and free from political interference (Siti Aisyah, 2023).

The long-term impact of political intervention in law enforcement is the erosion of public trust in the national justice system, which should be a key pillar in ensuring justice and legal certainty. When the public repeatedly witnesses indications of political interference in the legal process, whether through parliamentary pressure, power dynamics, or compromise of interests, the perception that the judicial process is no longer operating objectively and independently is formed. (Isra's Balance, 2023). In such circumstances, the law is viewed not as a neutral instrument of justice, but rather as part of a "political charade" whose outcome is determined through negotiations behind closed doors, including in parliament. This perception is extremely dangerous because it erodes the legitimacy of judicial institutions and undermines public confidence in the state's

ability to enforce the law fairly. Furthermore, the loss of public trust can trigger widespread apathy toward the legal process, with people becoming reluctant to report violations, distrusting dispute resolution mechanisms, and even seeking alternatives outside formal legal channels. If this situation persists, the foundations of the rule of law will become increasingly fragile, as the sustainability of the legal system fundamentally depends on public trust and active participation in upholding and complying with the law itself.

To mitigate this risk, it is necessary to strengthen the DPR's internal code of ethics which explicitly and firmly prohibits the discussion of technical material in ongoing cases (*sub judice*), so that the supervisory function remains within the constitutional corridor and does not become an instrument of intervention (Taufiqurrahman Syahuri, 2021). This strengthening is not only normative, but must also be accompanied by an effective ethical enforcement mechanism, including the provision of clear and measurable sanctions for council members who violate, in order to create a deterrent effect while maintaining the institutional integrity of parliament (Quarterly Point Tutik, 2022). On the other hand, the Constitutional Court needs to be encouraged to play a more progressive role in providing firm constitutional boundaries through decisions related to disputes over authority between state institutions, particularly in interpreting the scope of the DPR's oversight function so that it does not exceed the principle of judicial independence. This affirmation of boundaries is important to prevent the excessive expansion of legislative power into the judicial realm, while also ensuring that the checks and balances mechanism operates proportionally. Thus, the synergy between strengthening ethical norms at the legislative level and the affirmation of constitutional boundaries by the Constitutional Court is expected to create a law enforcement system that is more independent, accountable, and protected from political pressure (Ni'matul Huda, 2020).

In conclusion, political intervention in law enforcement disguised under the pretext of oversight is actually a paradox in a modern democratic system, because on the one hand, oversight by legislative institutions is an important instrument for maintaining accountability and preventing abuse of power. However, on the other hand, when such oversight exceeds constitutional limits and enters the technical realm of case handling, it has the potential to undermine the basic principles of justice that it seeks to uphold. Within the framework of a state based on the rule of law, the balance between democratic control and the independence of law enforcement is crucial, so that every form of oversight must be carried out proportionally, measuredly, and still respect the principles of due process of law and the impartiality of law enforcement officers. Without clear boundaries, the oversight function can easily be distorted into a tool of political pressure that not only disrupts the legal process but also erodes public trust in the justice system (Feri Amsari, 2021). Therefore, a strong moral commitment is needed from political actors, particularly members of the House of Representatives (DPR), to

prioritize legal and justice interests above practical political interests, accompanied by the strengthening of firm and implementable regulations to limit the scope for unauthorized intervention. Ultimately, only by upholding the rule of law and ensuring that politics is subject to the law, not the other way around, can a democratic system operate healthily, with integrity, and guarantee real justice for all citizens.

4. Conclusion

The dynamics of the House of Representatives' oversight within the framework of checks and balances on law enforcement in Indonesia demonstrate a fundamental problem: the blurred boundaries between its legitimate oversight function and the potential for intervention in the legal process. Normatively, the House of Representatives' oversight authority is a crucial instrument for maintaining accountability and preventing abuse of power by the executive, including in the law enforcement sector. However, in practice, the expansion of oversight, extending beyond the technical realm of case handling, has created constitutional tensions with the principle of judicial independence. Phenomena such as "parliamentary courts," pressure within the Hearing (RDP) forum, and the potential for intervention through other political mechanisms demonstrate that without clear boundaries, the oversight function can be distorted into a tool for political interests. This situation not only has the potential to undermine the objectivity and impartiality of law enforcement but also threatens fundamental principles of the rule of law, such as due process of law, equality before the law, and the presumption of innocence. Therefore, strategic steps are needed to redefine and affirm the operational boundaries of the House of Representatives' oversight function through strengthening regulations, harmonizing laws and regulations, and internalizing a strict institutional code of ethics. Oversight must be consistently directed at macro-policy aspects, institutional governance, and budget accountability, without interfering with the functional independence of law enforcement officials in handling concrete cases. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court's role is crucial in providing a more assertive constitutional interpretation to maintain balance between branches of power. This creates a proportional system of checks and balances, in which the House of Representatives (DPR) continues to effectively exercise its oversight function while respecting the rule of law and judicial independence. Only by maintaining this balance can public trust in the legal system be restored and strengthened, thereby sustainably achieving the goal of a just and democratic state based on the rule of law.

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