

Digital Transformation of Police Supervision and Its Implications for the Principle of Checks and Balances in the Indonesian Constitutional System

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Abstract. *Within Indonesia's post-reform constitutional order, the Indonesian National Police (Polri) functions as a civilian institution within the executive branch while exercising broad powers that have a direct impact on the protection of citizens' rights and fundamental freedoms. In practice, conventional oversight mechanisms over Polri often face structural and institutional constraints, particularly in ensuring transparency and accountability. The development of digital technology has introduced new forms of public-based oversight, enabling broader civic participation through digital reporting platforms and online monitoring. This study examines the digital transformation of Polri oversight as a constitutional phenomenon and analyzes its implications for the checks and balances principle. Using a normative juridical method with statutory and conceptual approaches, this research finds that digital oversight may strengthen constitutional accountability by expanding public scrutiny and access to information. Nevertheless, without a clear normative and institutional framework, digital oversight risks producing fragmented control mechanisms that operate outside formal accountability structures and potentially undermine due process of law. Therefore, the integration of digital oversight must be constitutionally designed to reinforce, rather than replace, established mechanisms of power limitation in a democratic constitutional state.*

Keywords: *Checks and Balances; Civic Participation; Constitutional Accountability; Digital Governance; Police Oversight.*

1. Introduction

More than two decades after the Reform era, the position of the Indonesian National Police (*Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia/Polri*) still reflects a tension between the ideals of a democratic legal order and political practices that influence police policies and actions. Normatively, Polri has been positioned as a civilian state institution, as affirmed in the Amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI*) and the Indonesian National Police. Article 30 paragraphs (3) and (4) stipulate that the Indonesian National Armed Forces, consisting of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, serve as state instruments responsible for defending,

protecting, and maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. In contrast, the Indonesian National Police functions as a state instrument responsible for maintaining public security and order, while carrying out the duties of protecting, safeguarding, serving the community, and enforcing the law.

These provisions affirm a clear separation between the TNI and Polri in carrying out their respective duties. Under Indonesia's constitutional framework, responsibility for national defense rests with the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), whereas the Indonesian National Police (Polri) is entrusted with maintaining public security and public order. Prior to the institutional separation following the reform era, defense and security functions were integrated under the Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/ABRI), which comprised the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Indonesian National Police (Huda, 2020; Fodhi et al., 2024). Institutional integration between the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (Polri) during the pre-reform era created structural ambiguity in the implementation of state functions. Overlapping authority between the defense domain under the TNI and the security domain under the Polri led to blurred functional delineation between the two institutions. The application of the ABRI dual-function doctrine during that period expanded the roles of the military and police into the socio-political sphere, thereby shifting their institutional orientation away from their primary duties as state instruments. The consequence of this condition was the weakening of constitutional democratic principles and the obstruction of the development of a state governance system that upholds civilian supremacy within Indonesia's rule-of-law framework (Sunarto, 2016).

Law Number 2 of 2002 positions the police as a state instrument that does not stand alone, but rather as an integral part of a broader state structure. Under this law, the police are mandated to carry out crucial tasks in maintaining national security and public order. As an institution directly responsible to the President, the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) plays an important role in creating a safe and orderly environment conducive to society (Dm, 2024). However, in constitutional practice, the relationship between the POLRI and the President still shows a high degree of dependence, particularly in the context of security policies and law enforcement that carry political implications.

This condition is particularly evident in a number of public demonstrations in various regions, where the repressive actions of security forces are frequently questioned from the perspective of democracy and human rights. In this context, the structural relationship between the Indonesian National Police (Polri) and the President appears to have a direct impact on the dynamics of handling public protest actions at the national level. For example, during the demonstration that took place on 25 August 2025, officers of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) carried out repressive measures in the process of crowd control at several strategic points in the capital city. The security approach adopted was considered inconsistent with the principles of proportionality and respect for freedom of expression, which should be guaranteed in a constitutional democratic system (Warsyim, 2023; Kansil & Vedora, 2024).

This situation indicates that the institutional placement of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) under the direct authority of the President continues to pose challenges in balancing the effective exercise of security functions with the protection of citizens' civil rights. The use of water cannon and tear gas did not only occur at the protest sites but also spread to the areas of Bendungan Hilir, Palmerah, and Pejompongan. At least three hundred fifty-one (351) individuals were arbitrarily arrested, of whom 196 (one hundred ninety-six) were children (Arya, 2025). This situation illustrates that although institutional reform has positioned the Polri as a professional and independent civilian institution, political realities and its hierarchical relationship with the President still create space for power bias in the exercise of its security functions.

In the context of a rule-of-law state that upholds the principle of checks and balances, these various events demonstrate the limitations of conventional oversight mechanisms over Polri (Wiyanto, 2016; Cutressa et al., 2025). Existing internal and external supervisory mechanisms are often considered insufficient to effectively ensure the accountability of the Polri, particularly when police actions intersect with political interests and executive power (Rahmatullah, 2013; Kansil & Vedora, 2024).

Digital transformation in public oversight has become increasingly relevant along with the rapid development of information technology within government institutions. The use of digital systems enables real-time monitoring processes, supported by integrated and well-documented data management, thereby facilitating continuous monitoring and evaluation activities. Hansen et al. (2021) found that the implementation of digitalization in internal oversight systems contributes to increased transparency, faster reporting mechanisms, and a reduced risk of data loss or manipulation practices. In the context of local government, digital oversight is not merely related to the provision of technological infrastructure, but also depends on institutional readiness, the level of digital literacy among officials, and the existence of a policy framework that supports the implementation of digital-based oversight systems (Warsyim, 2023; Fahlevvi et al., 2025).

Along with the development of information technology, a new phenomenon has emerged in the form of digital-based oversight of police performance, whether through social media, visual documentation, or public participation conducted online. This digital transformation of oversight opens a new space in the relationship between the state, law enforcement agencies, and citizens, while also raising constitutional questions regarding its position within the system of checks and balances. Therefore, it is important to examine how the digital transformation of oversight over the Indonesian National Police (Polri) has implications for the principle of checks and balances within Indonesia's constitutional system.

This study aims to examine the constitutional position of the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), the development of its oversight mechanisms, and the implications of digital transformation for public oversight within Indonesia's system of checks and balances. This aims to answer the following research questions:

1. What is the position of the Polri within Indonesia's constitutional checks and balances system and its oversight design?
2. How does digital transformation of Polri oversight affect Polri's performance as a phenomenon within Indonesia's constitutional system?
3. What are the implications of digital transformation in public oversight of Polri performance for the principle of checks and balances within Indonesia's constitutional system?

2. Research Methods

This research is a constitutional law study employing a normative juridical method, positioning the Indonesian National Police (Polri) as an organ of state power within Indonesia's constitutional structure. This approach is used to examine the changing configuration of oversight over the Polri as an armed law enforcement institution, particularly in relation to the principle of limiting power and checks and balances in a democratic rule-of-law state.

The approaches used in this study include a statute approach and a conceptual approach. The statutory approach is employed to examine the constitutional and legal foundations governing the institutional position of the Indonesian National Police (Polri), its constitutional relationship with the President, and the framework of oversight within Indonesia's constitutional system. Meanwhile, the conceptual approach provides the analytical basis for examining the principles of checks and balances, executive accountability, and civilian oversight as integral components of the constitutional control mechanism over state institutions.

In the field of constitutional law, civilian oversight is analyzed not merely as an instrument of public policy, but as a constitutional mechanism for limiting state power. This study conceptualizes civilian oversight of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) as a fundamental mechanism for safeguarding civilian supremacy and strengthening the accountability of executive authority. Along with the development of information technology, new forms of digital-based oversight conducted by society and non-state actors have emerged. This phenomenon is understood as an expansion of the checks and balances arena beyond the classical institutional design, raising constitutional issues regarding its legitimacy, position, and limits within the constitutional system.

As a conceptual framework, this study employs Jeremy Bentham's notion of the panopticon to interpret the relationship between surveillance and power in the modern state. In constitutional law terms, the panopticon is used to explain the character of centralized and hierarchical surveillance of citizens by state authorities. However, the development of digital technology has created a new dynamic in the form of counter-surveillance by society over state organs. The use of the panopticon concept in this study is directed at assessing how this shifting surveillance relationship affects the balance of power between the Polri, the President, and civil society within a democratic rule-of-law state framework.

The legal materials used in this study consist of primary legal materials, including the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, particularly Article 30, Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police, as well as MPR Decrees No. VI and VII of 2000. Secondary legal materials include constitutional law literature, academic books, scholarly journals, and the thoughts of legal experts on constitutionalism, checks and balances, control of power, and civilian supremacy. Tertiary legal materials consist of legal encyclopedias, dictionaries, and relevant online sources.

The analysis is conducted using a qualitative-prescriptive method, by interpreting legal norms and constitutional principles to construct arguments that are descriptive, analytical, and evaluative in nature. The focus of the analysis is directed at: (1) the position and function of the Polri as an organ of state power within Indonesia's constitutional system; (2) the transformation of oversight over the Polri as a constitutional phenomenon in the digital era; and (3) the constitutional implications of such digital oversight for the principle of checks and balances and the limitation of executive power.

Through a constitutional law approach and Bentham's conceptual framework, this study aims to assess the urgency of reconstructing the oversight design of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) so that it aligns with the principles of a democratic rule-of-law state, and to ensure that the development of digital-based oversight does not stand outside the constitutional framework, but is instead constitutionally integrated within Indonesia's system of checks and balances.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1. The Position of the Indonesian National Police and the Design of Supervision in the State System of Checks and Balances

In Indonesia's constitutional system, the Indonesian National Police (Polri) occupy the position of a state organ that carries out security and law enforcement functions under the executive branch. This position places the Polri in a hierarchical relationship with the President, while also granting it coercive authority that may directly affect citizens' constitutional rights.

Constitutionally, the position of the Polri as a civilian state instrument is regulated in Article 30 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which states:

"The Republic of Indonesia National Police as a state apparatus that maintains public security and order is tasked with protecting, serving, and enforcing the law."

The article affirms that the police are part of the governmental system that functions to maintain public order as well as provide services to the community. This norm positions law enforcement as a means, rather than an end in itself, in order to ensure the realization of an orderly and just social life.

From a juridical perspective, the regulation concerning the role of the Indonesian National Police as a state instrument carrying out security functions, law enforcement, and public service is emphasized in Article 8 paragraph (1) of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police, which states that:

“The Republic of Indonesia National Police is under the President”

The affirmation of the position of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) under the President, while simultaneously recognizing its institutional independence under the Police Law, contains a normative expectation that the Polri will transform into a state police oriented toward public interest. Accordingly, the Polri is expected to position itself in a manner that does not allow partiality other than toward law and the public. At the operational level, this is realized through close engagement between the police and society, ultimately enabling the Polri to gain a high level of public trust, even exceeding that of other state institutions (Tamrin, 2023).

The article confirms the Polri’s affiliation within the executive branch of power. However, this strengthened position is not automatically accompanied by an adequate oversight design, particularly considering the coercive nature of police authority, which has the potential to restrict citizens’ constitutional rights. The placement of the Polri within the executive branch carries constitutional consequences in that its law enforcement authority is not independent in the sense of judicial power, but is subject to the principle of governmental accountability. Therefore, oversight of the Polri cannot rely solely on internal mechanisms, but requires effective and layered external control.

Therefore, from a constitutional law perspective, the existence of oversight mechanisms over Polri is a constitutional prerequisite for maintaining the balance of power (checks and balances) and preventing abuse of authority (Wiyanto, 2016). Post-reform political dynamics show that the project of transforming the Polri into civic police has instead been accompanied by an increasing concentration of power. The argument of security and public order needs has become the basis for the expansion of police authority, which in practice has led to various forms of deviation and abuse of power. The concept of civic police, which should guide the police in carrying out their function of maintaining security and order, has instead become a justification for police involvement in various aspects of public life (Darry & Asri, 2022; Hardiansyah, 2025).

The limitation and oversight of police authority constitute essential elements within the constitutional system of checks and balances. Although Article 2 and Article 5 paragraph (1) of Law Number 2 of 2002 affirm the Polri as a state instrument in the field of security and law enforcement, various instances of abuse of authority indicate that the existing oversight design has not been effective. The weak control over the coercive powers of the Polri reflects an imbalance in the executive power relationship, suggesting that supervisory functions have not been optimally implemented within a democratic rule-of-law state.

Supervision is a process carried out by leaders to ensure that organizational goals, objectives, and tasks are implemented in accordance with plans, policies, instructions, and applicable

regulations. Supervision plays an important role because it can prevent misconduct, waste, deviations, and obstacles that may hinder the achievement of organizational goals and the execution of its duties (Dm, 2024; Cutressa et al., 2025). Efforts to improve the effectiveness of supervision and accountability of police performance constitute a fundamental element in the implementation of the principle of good governance, in order to ensure the realization of governance that is integrity-based, transparent, professional, and publicly accountable.

It can be seen that the placement of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) within the executive branch of power, combined with its broad coercive authority, makes oversight an inseparable constitutional issue within the principle of checks and balances. The existing oversight design reflects a tension between the need for effective law enforcement and the demand for limiting state power in a democratic rule-of-law system. This situation indicates that oversight of the Polri is not only related to institutional and administrative aspects, but also touches upon the power relations between the state and citizens, which in turn opens space for discussion on the development and expansion of oversight forms beyond conventional mechanisms.

The discussion on the oversight of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) cannot be separated from its position as an organ of state power within the executive branch that exercises coercive authority. In the context of a rule-of-law state, the exercise of such authority requires an oversight mechanism capable of maintaining a balance between the need for law enforcement and the protection of citizens' constitutional rights (Suteja, 2013). The development of information technology has also influenced the way oversight of the Polri is carried out. Oversight, which previously relied on formal institutional mechanisms, is now increasingly involving digital public space and public participation. This phenomenon indicates a shift in oversight patterns that is not only institutional but also social, while simultaneously opening new analytical space within the perspective of constitutional law. Within this framework, the discussion is focused on the relationship between the position of the Polri, the design of oversight within the checks and balances system, and the emergence of digital-based oversight as part of contemporary constitutional dynamics. This framework is important to understand how the transformation of oversight takes place and its implications for the relationship between the state, law enforcement agencies, and society within a democratic rule-of-law state.

3.2. Digital Transformation of Police Supervision as a State Phenomenon

The development of digital technology has given rise to new forms of oversight over the performance of state apparatus, including the Polri, which are widely carried out by the public through digital public spaces. Along with the advancement of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), digitalization has emerged as an innovative solution to address various governance problems (Triarto, 2025). Fenomena ini menandai terjadinya transformasi pengawasan yang tidak lagi sepenuhnya bergantung pada mekanisme kelembagaan formal, melainkan melibatkan partisipasi warga negara sebagai aktor pengawas.

In the perspective of constitutional law, the digital transformation of Polri oversight cannot be understood merely as a technical innovation, but as a constitutional phenomenon that affects

power relations, accountability, and the legitimacy of oversight over state organs. Administrative law, which has historically developed in an analog context, is now facing significant pressure to adapt to digital technological developments (Cutressa et al., 2025). These challenges are not only related to the regulation of new digital instruments, but also concern efforts to ensure that fundamental principles of governance, such as accountability, transparency, and public trust, are maintained in the exercise of increasingly digitized state administrative authority (Kusuma & Utama, 2025). The United States demonstrates the importance of judicial oversight mechanisms and the establishment of independent supervisory bodies in the use of technology by law enforcement agencies. Judicial oversight is a mechanism for monitoring by the judiciary over government actions or policies to ensure compliance with the law, prevent abuse of power, and protect citizens' rights within the framework of the principle of checks and balances. South Korea highlights the importance of consistency between digitalization systems, data protection regulations, and professional training for officials. Both countries also emphasize the need for public information disclosure regarding the use of technology in law enforcement processes as a form of accountability and transparency (Saragih et al., 2025).

By carrying out a holistic digital, organizational, and operational transformation, the Polri can enhance effectiveness and efficiency in performing its duties and responsibilities in responding to societal challenges and expectations in the era of globalization (Tuntalanai, 2023). Such transformation efforts are not directed solely at technological aspects, but also encompass changes in mindset, organizational culture, and patterns of police services to the public. In this context, digital transformation is positioned as an instrument to strengthen a policing approach oriented toward public service, transparency, and the development of public trust. Therefore, various policy initiatives and internal programs of the Polri are developed to bridge the utilization of technology with cultural and mental reform within the police institution, ensuring that the implementation of police duties remains aligned with the values of humanism and public accountability.

The Commander Wish program is designed as an initiative to strengthen the relationship between the Polri and the public through the renewal of organizational culture and the formation of attitudes and mindsets among police personnel. This program aims to encourage Polri officers to become more responsive, humane, and adaptive in carrying out their duties and responsibilities. In addition, Commander Wish places the strengthening of technology-based public services as a central focus, accompanied by efforts to build public trust and promote openness of information to the media and society, so that the delivery of police services can be effective, accessible, and transparent (Saragih et al., 2025).

In line with the Polri reform agenda, strengthening the oversight function is positioned as a strategic pillar within the vision of transforming toward "Polri Presisi." The Inspector of General Supervision of the Polri, Commissioner General Wahyu Widada, emphasized that police transformation from the outset was designed to cover four main areas, namely operations, organization, public services, and oversight. This affirmation shows that oversight is not

positioned as a complementary function, but as a key element in ensuring the accountability and transparency of police authority implementation (Divisi Humas Polri, 2025).

The digital transformation of Polri oversight is a constitutional phenomenon because it directly affects how state power is supervised, held accountable, and legitimized within the system of checks and balances. Control is a value in society that is often interpreted as supervision or oversight. In essence, public control over state administrators or the government is important to ensure that citizens' rights are fulfilled in the implementation of government (Badan Pengkajian MPR RI, 2017). In addition, when society is able to influence, control, and evaluate public policy, the higher the level of participation, the higher the degree and scope of the benefits of such policies or legislation for the community (Nurbaiti & Pelangi, 2025).

Digital oversight does not only change internal instruments and procedures within the police institution, but also expands oversight actors by involving the public as part of the control mechanism over state organs. This expansion of oversight space affects the power relations between the Polri as part of the executive branch and citizens as holders of sovereignty, thereby placing digital oversight within the constitutional realm rather than merely the administrative one. In line with the digital transformation of oversight, the Polri has also introduced a concrete innovation through the QR Code Yanduan program, which facilitates public complaints submission online. This system enables reporting, verification, and follow-up to be carried out in an integrated manner from the National Police Headquarters to regional police offices, making the oversight process more transparent, faster, and more accountable. This initiative demonstrates how digital oversight not only expands public participation as control actors, but also realizes the principles of good governance in constitutional practice, while strengthening public trust in the police institution (Portal Humas Polri, 2025).

In addition, the digital transformation of Polri oversight shifts the oversight design from a hierarchical and closed model toward a more open, participatory, and transparency-based public pattern. This change has implications for the principles of governmental accountability, human rights protection, and the limitation of the use of coercive state authority (Triarto, 2025). Thus, the digitalization of police oversight cannot be understood merely as a policy innovation, but rather as a constitutional dynamic that reshapes the relationship between the state, law enforcement agencies, and society within a democratic rule-of-law system. The digital transformation of Polri oversight does not merely reflect the modernization of police working instruments, but signifies a fundamental shift in the pattern of state power supervision. The transition from hierarchical and closed oversight to a more open and participatory model places society as part of the control mechanism over the exercise of state authority (Pulungan & Alw, 2022). In a constitutional context, this development has direct implications for the relationship between the Polri as an executive organ and citizens as holders of sovereignty, thereby requiring digital oversight to be understood as part of the evolving dynamics of checks and balances in a democratic rule-of-law state.

3.3. Implications of Digital Transformation of Supervision on the Principle of Checks and Balances in a Democratic Rule of Law

Digital transformation has changed the understanding, concepts, and ways of living in society, nation, and state at the global level. Debates at both theoretical and practical levels regarding the future of democracy in the digital era continue to develop (Hartiwiningsih, 2023). The digital transformation of Polri oversight carries ambivalent constitutional implications for the principle of checks and balances. On one hand, digital oversight has the potential to strengthen transparency and accountability of police officers through public counter-surveillance mechanisms (Nasser, 2021). On the other hand, the absence of a clear normative framework risks placing digital oversight outside the constitutionally designed system of checks and balances, thereby potentially giving rise to unaccountable oversight practices that contradict the rule of law. In this context, the conceptual analysis of panopticon is used to assess the balance between the authority of state surveillance and the need for constitutionally legitimate civilian oversight.

From the perspective of good governance and e-government, digital innovations such as LAPOR! Mas Wapres do expand public participation, enhance transparency, and accelerate bureaucratic responses to public complaints (Cahyani, 2025). However, within the framework of the principle of checks and balances, the effectiveness of such mechanisms is not determined solely by the availability of a digital platform, but by how public complaints are processed, followed up, and institutionally accounted for. Without clear integration into a constitutionally legitimate oversight structure, digital oversight risks remaining merely administrative and symbolic in function, without genuinely strengthening control over the exercise of state authority.

In addition, the expansion of digital-based oversight also raises issues regarding the boundary between public participation and excessive surveillance. In an open digital space, oversight mechanisms may shift into a form of trial by social media, where public opinion functions as a tool of punishment without legal procedures that ensure the presumption of innocence and the protection of human rights. This condition shows that digital oversight, while potentially strengthening accountability, can also disrupt the balance of power relations if it is not framed within the structure of a democratic rule-of-law state. Information openness can also present a variety of information sources whose credibility is unknown. As a result, digital spaces may be filled with fake news and hoaxes, making it difficult for society to be controlled and more susceptible to propaganda (Nugraheni, 2025). Another important concern is the public's tendency to regard viral social evidence as more valid than formal proof in court, a phenomenon often associated with the post-truth era. In several cases, public opinion is shaped more by screenshots of conversations or widely circulated videos in digital space, rather than by evidence that has been tested through judicial proceedings. This condition reflects a serious challenge for the justice system, while at the same time emphasizing the urgency of strengthening public legal literacy regarding legal processes and evidentiary standards that are valid within a rule-of-law state (Harseno, 2025).

The phenomenon shows that digital space does not only function as a medium for information dissemination, but also as an arena for the formation of social control that operates through visibility and continuous surveillance. In this context, society is no longer merely the object of state surveillance practices, but simultaneously becomes a subject that monitors and is evaluated by others. This logic aligns with Jeremy Bentham's panopticon idea, as further developed by Michel Foucault, where power does not always operate through direct coercion, but through the internalization of constant and uncertain surveillance. Digital oversight of law enforcement officials, including the Polri, therefore needs to be understood not merely as an instrument of accountability, but also as a disciplinary mechanism that shapes behavior, perceptions, and power relations between the state, its apparatus, and society within digital space (Surbakti & Abdilah, 2021).

Within the framework of the checks and balances principle, oversight of the Polri is normatively positioned within an institutional configuration that involves internal supervision, legislative oversight by the House of Representatives, and judicial oversight through court mechanisms (Wiyanto, 2016). However, the development of digital-based oversight involving public participation introduces new oversight actors that are not fully accommodated within the existing constitutional design. Public oversight through digital spaces operates outside formal institutional mechanisms, with a logic of visibility and rapid response that differs from constitutional supervisory procedures. This condition raises questions regarding the position of digital public oversight within the checks and balances system whether it functions as a complement that strengthens accountability, as a substitute that potentially weakens the role of formal supervisory institutions, or as a form of social control that exists outside the framework of state power limitation. This ambiguity indicates a conceptual and normative gap within the constitutional system, which implies that digital public oversight has not yet been fully integrated into constitutionally legitimate oversight mechanisms.

Thus, digital oversight of the Polri presents a new reality in the practice of checks and balances that has not yet been fully accommodated within the existing constitutional design. The expansion of the public's role through digital spaces demonstrates the potential to strengthen control over police authority, while at the same time revealing the limitations of the legal framework governing the position, boundaries, and implications of such oversight. This condition indicates that the digital transformation of oversight does not only raise issues of effectiveness, but also opens further discussion on how digitally based public oversight can be proportionally positioned within a democratic rule-of-law system.

4. Conclusion

The institutional placement of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) as a state organ within the executive branch confers a strategically significant role while simultaneously giving rise to constitutional and institutional challenges within Indonesia's system of government. The coercive authority of the Polri, which directly intersects with citizens' rights and freedoms, requires a strong, layered, and effective oversight design as part of the checks and balances

mechanism. In the context of a democratic rule-of-law state, oversight of the Polri cannot be reduced to a mere internal administrative mechanism, but must be understood as a constitutional prerequisite to limit power and ensure accountability in governance. A weak oversight design risks producing an imbalanced concentration of authority, thereby placing the Polri in a dominant position without adequate control. Therefore, strengthening and restructuring oversight of the Polri becomes a crucial element in maintaining the balance of power relations between the state and its citizens. The digital transformation of Polri oversight reflects a shift from a hierarchical and closed model toward a more open and participatory system through digital public spaces. This transformation expands the role of society as an oversight actor, making supervision no longer the exclusive domain of state institutions. From a constitutional perspective, digital oversight has become a constitutional phenomenon that influences power relations, institutional accountability, and the legitimacy of the Polri. Therefore, digital oversight should be understood as part of the evolving constitutional dynamics that reshape the relationship between the state, law enforcement agencies, and society. The implications of digital transformation of oversight for the principle of checks and balances in a democratic rule-of-law state are complex and require careful formulation. On the one hand, digitalization of oversight has the potential to strengthen public control, enhance transparency, and encourage accountability of the Polri as a state institution. On the other hand, without a clear legal and institutional framework, digital oversight risks producing unstructured forms of control that are vulnerable to viral bias and may blur the principles of due process of law and human rights protection. This condition shows that digital oversight cannot stand outside the checks and balances system, but must be normatively integrated to remain aligned with the principle of limiting power. Therefore, the digital transformation of oversight of the Polri must be positioned within a democratic rule-of-law framework that balances technological innovation, control of power, and the protection of citizens' rights.

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