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OPTIMIZATION OF JUDICIAL SUPERVISION IN INDONESIA: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN MAINTAINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY

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ABSTRACT

Keywords: Supervision of judges in Indonesia is a crucial element to maintain the integrity, independence, and professionalism of Judicial Supervision; the judicial system. This study analyzes the effectiveness of the Supreme Court; Judicial judicial oversight mechanism through an internal approach by Commission; Code of Ethics; the Supreme Court, external by the Judicial Commission, and Judicial Independence. the role of the community through a code of ethics. With a qualitative descriptive-analytical approach, this study uses secondary data from legal documents, such as the 1945 Constitution, Law Number 48 of 2009, and the Joint Regulation of the MA-KY 2012, as well as interviews with judges and academics. The results of the study indicate that the MA's internal supervision is constrained by a large workload, while the KY's supervision is limited due to the Constitutional Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, which excludes MK judges and supreme court justices, triggering the risk of judicial corruption and a crisis of public trust. Public supervision through a code of ethics is effective but requires further education. The main challenges include overlapping authority between the MA and KY and the lack of supervisory integrity. This study recommends better coordination, strengthening the authority of the KY, and increasing the role of the community to ensure justice and judicial independence.

A. INTRODUCTION

Supervision of judges is one of the main pillars in maintaining the integrity, independence, and professionalism of the judicial system in Indonesia. As a country based on law that upholds the principle of justice, Indonesia places supervision of judges as a crucial element to ensure that judicial power is exercised in accordance with the law and ethics.¹ In the Indonesian judicial system, supervision of judges is carried out through a dual approach, namely internal supervision by the Supreme Court (*Mahkamah Agung*/MA) and external supervision by the Judicial Commission (*Komisi Yudisial*/KY), as well as involving the role of society through the code of ethics mechanism.² All three have a strategic role in maintaining the dignity of the judiciary, preventing abuse of authority, and ensuring that judges' decisions reflect the justice expected by society. This supervision is not only aimed at correcting errors, but also at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration of justice, so that public trust in the legal system can be maintained.³

Conceptually, supervision can be understood as the process of observing the implementation of organizational tasks to ensure compliance with established plans.⁴ In the context of the judiciary, supervision of judges is directed to ensure that judges carry out their duties with full caution, independence, and professionalism. According to Sondang P. Siagian, supervision is a process of observation to ensure that work is running according to plan, while Victor M. Situmorang emphasizes that supervision is an effort to ensure that the implementation of tasks is in accordance with the provisions and objectives set. In this case, supervision of judges is not merely looking for mistakes, but rather to ensure that the justice system runs on the rails of law and ethics, so that it can provide justice in accordance with the expectations of the community.⁵

¹ Andi Hakim Lubis, Junaidi Lubis, and Said Rizal. "Optimalisasi Pengawasan dan Pembinaan Hakim Menuju Kekuasaan Kehakiman Yang Berintegritas dan Bermartabat." *Ilmu Hukum Prima (IHP)* 5, no. 1 (2022): 21.

² Fajlurrahman Jurdi, Rizqa Ananda Hanapi, and Taufik Hidayat. "Optimalisasi Fungsi Pengawasan Dewan Etik Mahkamah Konstitusi." *Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan* 50, no. 3 (2020): 693.

³ Muhamad Iqbal Iqbal, Susanto Susanto, and Moh Sutoro. "Functionalization of E-Court System in Eradicating Judicial Corruption at The Level of Administrative Management." *Jurnal Dinamika Hukum* 19, no. 2 (2019): 381. See also, Djamaludin Djamaludin, Muhammad Fahruddin Aziz, Yanuriansyah Ar-Rasyid, and Iskandar Ali As-Sayyis. "Assessing the impact of electronic court systems on the efficiency of judicial processes in the era of digital transformation." *Volksgeist: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Dan Konstitusi* 12, no. 3 (2023): 11.

⁴ Rahmat Aiman. "Hukum dan korupsi: Tantangan dan solusi dalam pemberantasan korupsi di Indonesia." *Peradaban Journal of Law and Society* 3, no. 1 (2024): 19.

⁵ Henry Indraguna and Faisal Santiago. "Building judge integrity to achieve judge independence related to judicial decisions through optimization of external supervision." *J. Legal Ethical & Regul. Isses* 25 (2022): 11. See also, Abdi, Zamroni Faizal, and Chintya Khaerunnisa. "Revitalization of Supervision of the Judicial Commission as Strengthening Judicial Institutions".

The judicial power in Indonesia, as regulated in Article 24 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution (UUD), is independent and autonomous, which is exercised by the Supreme Court, the judicial bodies below it, and the Constitutional Court. This independence gives judges the freedom to examine and decide cases without external intervention. However, this freedom also demands a strong oversight mechanism to prevent abuse of authority. Without adequate oversight, judicial independence can turn into arbitrariness, which has the potential to damage public trust in the judiciary.⁶ Therefore, supervision of judges is an urgent need to maintain the integrity and credibility of the judicial system.

Internal supervision by the Supreme Court, as stipulated in Article 39 of Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power, covers administrative, financial, and behavioral aspects of judges. This supervision is carried out through the Supreme Court Supervisory Body, which is tasked with monitoring the implementation of justice in all judicial environments under the Supreme Court.⁷ Meanwhile, the Judicial Commission, which was established based on Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution, acts as an external supervisor that focuses on maintaining the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges, as well as proposing the appointment of supreme court justices. However, the KY's authority is limited after Constitutional Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, which exempts Constitutional Court judges and supreme court justices from KY supervision, raising concerns about the potential for judicial corruption and a crisis of public trust.

In addition to formal supervision, the public also has an important role in supervising judges through a code of ethics, which is regulated in the Joint Regulation of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission Number 02/PB/MA/IX/2012-02/PB/P.KY/09/2012. This code of ethics serves as a

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in Maintaining the Independence and Integrity of Judges." *JUSTICES: Journal of Law* 3, no. 3 (2024): 192. See also, Siddiq, Nurman, and Rudhiana Salam. "Enhancing Legal Certainty through Legal Reform in Indonesia: Problems and Efforts to Strengthen Legal Institutions." *Strata Law Review* 3, no. 1 (2025): 12.

⁶ Andi Darmawansya Tenri Liweng and Khairil Akram. "Optimizing the Role of the South Sulawesi Inspectorate in Handling Regional Government Supervision Issues to Achieve Transparency and Accountability." *Golden Ratio of Law and Social Policy Review* 4, no. 1 (2024): 23. Usman Rasyid, Novendri Mohamad Nggilu, Fence Wantu, Julisa Aprilia Kaluku, and Ahmad Ahmad. "Reformulation of the Authority of Judicial Commission: Safeguarding the Future of Indonesian Judicial Power." *Jambura Law Review* 5, no. 2 (2023): 410.

⁷ Achmad Mitftah Farid, Hibnu Nugroho, and Dwi Hapsari Retnaningrum. "Pelaksanaan Fungsi Pengawasan Terhadap Perilaku Hakim Oleh Mahkamah Agung." *Soedirman Law Review* 2, no. 1 (2020): 30. See also, Alasman Mpesau. "Kewenangan Badan Pengawas Pemilu dalam penanganan pelanggaran administrasi ditinjau dari perspektif sistem peradilan Indonesia." *Audito Comparative Law Journal (ACLJ)* 2, no. 2 (2021): 75. See also, Hofifah Hofifah. "Pelibatan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi dalam Pengawasan Hakim Mahkamah Agung dalam Lingkungan Peradilan Perspektif Fath Dhari'ah." *Al-Qanun: Jurnal Pemikiran dan Pembaharuan Hukum Islam* 26, no. 1 (2023): 101.

guideline for the public, including the media, to monitor the behavior of judges. In the era of modern democracy, openness of information through the media allows the public to reveal irregularities in the judicial process, which can then be followed up by formal supervisory institutions. The role of the media as an external supervisor not only helps to increase accountability, but also strengthens social control over the implementation of judicial power.

The main challenge in the supervision of judges is the coordination between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission, which often experience overlapping authority, as well as the limited effectiveness of the Judicial Commission due to the Constitutional Court's decision.⁸ In addition, the awareness and integrity of both the supervisor and the supervised are determining factors in the success of supervision. Dishonesty or ignorance in the implementation of supervision can hinder the achievement of the goal of a fair and transparent trial. Therefore, supervision must be carried out with a constructive approach, not only to find errors, but also to strengthen the justice system as a whole. This study aims to analyze the effectiveness of the judicial supervision mechanism in Indonesia, both through internal supervision by the Supreme Court, external supervision by the Judicial Commission, and public supervision through a code of ethics, and to identify challenges and solutions to improve the integrity and independence of the justice system.

B. RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses a normative juridical approach with a descriptiveanalytical method to examine the effectiveness of judicial supervision in Indonesia. A qualitative approach was chosen because it is able to provide an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of judicial supervision through the analysis of non-numerical data that is rich in context. This study refers to secondary data collected from legal documents, such as the 1945 Constitution, Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power, Law Number 18 of 2011 concerning the Judicial Commission, and Joint Regulation of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission Number 02/PB/MA/IX/2012-02/PB/P.KY/09/2012 concerning the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judges' Behavior. In addition, official reports from the Supreme Court, the Judicial Commission, and the Constitutional Court's decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006 are also the main sources of data.

Data were collected through desk research that included analysis of legal literature, academic journals, and media articles related to judicial

⁸ Ahmad Fauzan, Ayon Diniyanto, and Abdul Hamid. "Regulation Arrangement through The Judicial Power: The Challenges of Adding the Authority of The Constitutional Court and The Supreme Court." *Journal of Law and Legal Reform* 3, no. 3 (2022): 423. See also, Muhammad Siddiq Armia. "Constitutional Courts And Judicial Review: Lesson Learned For Indonesia." *Jurnal Negara Hukum* 8, no. 1 (2017): 117.

supervision. To complement secondary data, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants, such as judges, members of the Judicial Commission, and legal academics, to gain first-hand perspectives on the challenges and effectiveness of supervision. Data analysis was conducted using a thematic approach, where data were organized based on key themes, such as internal, external, and community oversight. Data triangulation was applied to ensure validity by comparing findings from legal documents, interviews, and media reports. The study also considered a normative approach to evaluate the conformity of supervisory practices with the prevailing legal framework. Thus, this method allows for a comprehensive analysis of the judicial oversight mechanism, the challenges faced, and recommendations for improving the justice system.

C. Results

1. The Nature of Judicial Supervision

The term supervision means inviting "a person or several people to carry out an activity with full caution, so that no mistakes or errors occur.⁹ The definition of supervision by Sondang P. Siagian provides the following definition,¹⁰ "the process of observing the implementation of all organizational activities to ensure that all work being carried out is in accordance with the previously determined plan". Meanwhile, another definition of supervision was put forward by Victor M. Situmorang, supervision is:¹¹ "every effort and action in order to determine the extent to which the implementation of tasks is carried out according to the provisions and targets to be achieved."

Supervision consists of two subjects, namely those being supervised and those supervising, supervision will be considered necessary if it is considered that something is wrong or there is an error such as minors must always be under the supervision of adults because they are considered not yet able to distinguish between dangerous things, supervision of naughty children will be increased twice as much as normal children.¹² In today's developments, supervision is not only carried out on minors but supervision needs to be carried out on adults such as supervision of a wife towards her husband because her husband is considered to be cheating.

⁹ H. Makmur. *Efektivitas Kebijakan Kelembagaan Pengawasan.* Bandung, PT. Refika Aditama. 2015

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ahmad Firmanto Prasedyomukti and Rakhmat Bowo Suharto. "The Role of Judicial Commission on Supervision of Judge's Crime in Indonesia." *Jurnal Daulat Hukum* 1, no. 4 (2018): 900. See also, Fitria Indah Damayanti and Hari Soeskandi. "Kewenangan Jaksa Penuntut Umum Dalam Upaya Hukum Peninjauan Kembali." *Bureaucracy Journal: Indonesia Journal of Law and Social-Political Governance* 2, no. 2 (2022): 284.

In the context of institutions, both government and private sector apply the concept of supervision, each employee will be supervised by his superior in completing his work. Supervision in the context of superiors towards subordinates in terms of correcting the results of his kingdom, and so on, the superior will be supervised by his superior until finally the supervision carried out by the public in the form of trust.

Basically, supervision is very necessary in all organizational institutions, both private and public institutions. This supervision is needed in order to "increase the efficiency and professionalism of the implementation of various institutional programs so that they can provide results in accordance with previously established planning.".¹³ The success of supervision in an organizational institution is not the number of findings or errors recorded, but supervision will be successful if the plans of an organizational institution run according to the established plan.¹⁴

Supervision of state institutions, especially judicial institutions, is different from supervision carried out on other private organizations. Supervision of judicial institutions, in addition to aiming to ensure that judicial institutions always run within the agreed rules, is also intended so that judicial institutions do not act beyond their authority, namely abuse of power. The judicial institution in the 1945 Constitution, which is called the judicial power, in carrying out its duties and functions in adjudicating, is independent and free, meaning that judicial power is exercised independently. This is very risky if they are not supervised, both organizationally and by an official external supervisory institution so that the dignity and trust in the judicial institution are maintained.

The obstacle to supervision carried out by the KY is that the KY's supervisory authority is not optimal because the form of the KY is not part of the MA.¹⁵ Many KY recommendations can be responded to by the MA, besides that, because the KY as a judicial supervisory institution often overlaps by carrying out activities that indirectly, one of which is intervening in the duties of judges in deciding cases by entering into cases that are being examined in court. The KY's overlapping actions occur because the KY is independent as if the institution is free from supervision, therefore the KY should be part of the

¹³ *Ibid*

¹⁴ Oscar T. Lenning, Denise M. Hill, Kevin P. Saunders, Andria Stokes, and Alisha Solan. *Powerful learning communities: A guide to developing student, faculty, and professional learning communities to improve student success and organizational effectiveness*. London, Routledge, 2023.

¹⁵ Methodius Kossay. *Dinamika Penghubung Komisi Yudisial Dalam Pengawasan Hakim Di Indonesia*. Semarang, Penerbit Yayasan Prima Agus Teknik, 2024.

MA so that the KY's duties and authorities are more optimal and effective and a control system is created, namely checks and balances.¹⁶

The success of a form of supervision that is in public institutions such as the executive, legislative, judiciary, and audit or supervision in private institutions is very much determined by the awareness and level of knowledge of both the supervised and the supervisor of an activity in the field of mindset and supervisory action patterns. Phenomenally, what we witness in society is that dishonesty and lack of knowledge of the supervisory components cause failure of activities within the institution. Why is this so? Actually, there are many variables that can cause dishonesty for both the supervisory component and the supervised component. In addition, one of the other causes is the lack of knowledge or in other words, the stupidity of the supervisory components in an institution so that they do not understand the importance of supervision in carrying out a task or job so that it is not only detrimental to themselves but can also be detrimental to the institution where they work.

In essence, supervisory actions are actions in order to make the work program a success, not to disrupt the work program. Supervision aims to keep the institution running on the agreed rules. The supervisory institution can be in the organization or can come from an external institution with the same goal of carrying out supervision. The supervisory institution is people whose credibility is not morally reprehensible and are respected people, not just feared people. The supervisory institution must embrace, not scare, the supervisor and the supervised walk hand in hand without anyone feeling the most right and the one who feels guilty.

2. Judicial Commission and the Supervisory Duties of Judges Post Constitutional Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006

The Judicial Commission is a state institution that serves as an external supervisor of the judiciary, namely outside the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court. After the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, a new state institution was also included, namely the Judicial Commission, which is regulated in Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution as a result of the third amendment. Furthermore, the provisions of Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution are formulated as follows:

(1) The Judicial Commission is independent and has the authority to propose the appointment of supreme court judges and has other authority in order to maintain and uphold the honor of judges, the dignity and behavior of judges.

¹⁶ Melfa Deu. "Kode Etik Hakim Dan Komisi Yudisial Di Indonesia." *Lex Et Societatis* 3, no. 1 (2015), 17.

- (2) Members of the Judicial Commission must have knowledge and experience in the legal field and have integrity and an irreproachable personality.
- (3) Members of the Judicial Commission are appointed and dismissed by the President with the approval of the People's Representative Council.
- (4) The composition, position and membership of the members of the Judicial Commission are regulated by law..

In constitutional juridical terms, the placement of the Judicial Commission is indeed close to or in the same group as the provisions governing the Supreme Court as the holder of judicial power. However, the Judicial Commission cannot be included as part of the judicial power, because this commission does not have the authority to try.¹⁷ The Judicial Commission is only a supporting commission, which helps uphold the judicial power. As is known, the Judicial Commission only has the authority to conduct selection/recruitment of prospective judges together with the Supreme Court, of course before that authority is revoked by the Constitutional Court. ¹⁸

This authority is obtained based on the provisions of Article 13A paragraph (2) and paragraph (3) of Law Number 50 of 2009 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 7 of 1989 concerning Religious Courts, and Article 14A paragraph (2) and paragraph (3) of Law Number 51 of 2009 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 5 of 1986 concerning State Administrative Courts, and Law Number 49 of 2009 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 2 of 1986 concerning General Courts.

The lawmakers, in this case the President and the DPR, certainly have strong reasons to involve the Judicial Commission in conducting the selection of prospective judges.¹⁹ At least they have the aim of selecting prospective judges who have quality, in order to participate in upholding the law and

¹⁷ Suparto Suparto, Kim Hyeonsoo, David Hardiago, and Rani Fadhila Syafrinaldi. "Enhancing External Oversight of Constitutional Judges: A Study on the Role of the Judicial Commission in Indonesia and South Korea." *Lex Scientia Law Review* 8, no. 1 (2024): 85.

¹⁸ Rommy Patra, Muhammad Syafei, Aldi Aldi, Felix Lawira, and Muhammad Badarul Husna. "The existence of the judicial commission in supervising judges in indonesia." *Pranata Hukum* 19, no. 1 (2024): 11. See also, Siti Kotijah, Muhammad Rizki An Noor, Ine Ventyrina, and Poppilea Erwinta. "Problematics of the oversight of the code of conduct and the code of judgment between the judicial commission and the supreme court." *Awang Long Law Review* 5, no. 2 (2023): 665.

¹⁹ Ija Suntana and Dini Inasyah Alfaridah. "Hubungan Kelembagaan antara Komisi Yudisial dengan Mahkamah Konstitusi: Analisis Siyasah Dusturiyah Terhadap Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 005/PUU-IV/2006." *Japhtn-Han* 1, no. 2 (2022): 235.

justice in order to realize the independence of the courts through the independence of judges as enforcers of law and justice.²⁰

This objective is revealed from one of the considerations of Law Number 18 of 2011 concerning the Judicial Commission, which is formulated: "that the Judicial Commission has an important role in efforts to realize an independent judicial power through proposing the appointment of supreme court judges and other authorities in order to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges for the sake of upholding law and justice in accordance with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.²¹

Furthermore, in Law Number 22 of 2004 concerning the Judicial Commission, one of its considerations also emphasizes that: The Judicial Commission has an important role in efforts to realize an independent judicial power through the nomination of supreme court judges and supervision of judges that is transparent and participatory in order to uphold the honor and dignity, and maintain the behavior of judges.²² So, it is very clear that the Judicial Commission plays a role in upholding the independence of the judicial institution as an effort to realize judicial independence.

Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution places the Judicial Commission as an independent State Institution, and has the authority to propose candidates for supreme court justices and other authorities in order to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges. This provision is a strong legal basis for the Judicial Commission to play a very important and strategic role in efforts to realize an independent judicial power in the context of a state of law. Although the Judicial Commission is not an actor of judicial power, its function is related to judicial power, namely the supervisory function.²³

The birth of the Judicial Commission from the womb of the constitution was motivated by the need to build a more effective and constructive judicial supervision system. The reason is that the existing judicial supervision mechanism contains a number of weaknesses. The judicial supervision carried out by the Supreme Court is very closed, not accountable, and tends to prioritize esprit de'corps. Such supervisory conditions are recognized by the

²⁰ Lila Graciella Yuwono. "Kewenangan Komisi Yudisial dalam Pengawasan Hakim: Analisis Terhadap Putusan MK No. 005/PUU-IV/2006." *Jurnal ISO: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial, Politik dan Humaniora* 5, no. 1 (2025): 10.

²¹ Widayati Widayati, Winanto Winanto, Denny Suwondo, Arpangi Arpangi, and Yudhi Taufiq Nur Hidayat. "Reconstruction of the Judicial Commission's Authority in Promoting Judges with Integrity." *Jurnal Hukum* 39, no. 2 (2023): 274.

²² Intan Surullaha, Beth Manullang, M. Faiz Razki Perdana, and Aditya Thapsuandji. "Pencabutan Kewenangan Fungsi Pengawasan Komisi Yudisial Terhadap Hakim Mahkamah Konstitusi: Peninjauan Terhadap Putusan MK Nomor 005/PUU-IV/2006." *Innovative: Journal Of Social Science Research* 4, no. 3 (2024): 18622.

²³ Ousu Mendy and Ebrima Sarr. "The Judiciary in Governance: Understanding the Juridical Nature and Function of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia." *Journal of Indonesian Constitutional Law* 2, no. 1 (2025): 12.

Supreme Court itself, which in turn fosters judicial corruption in the body of the court institution.

Another factor that drives the birth of the Judicial Commission is the need to build a more objective, transparent and participatory supreme court justice selection system. In this kind of selection system, it is hoped that politicization can be eliminated in determining supreme court justice candidates. The public can also be actively involved in monitoring and critically assessing the process and track record of supreme court justice candidates. So that the supreme court justices produced have integrity, credibility and can uphold the principles of independence and impartiality in making decisions.

In addition to being regulated in Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution, the Judicial Commission has also been regulated in more detail in Law Number 22 of 2004 concerning the Judicial Commission which was later amended by Law Number 18 of 2011. The definition of the Judicial Commission is regulated in Article 2 of Law Number 22 of 2004, namely "The Judicial Commission is a state institution that is independent and in the implementation of its authority is free from interference or influence from other powers."

In Article 6 of Law Number 18 of 2011, the membership of the Judicial Commission has been determined based on representation from former judges, academics, legal practitioners and community leaders, namely:

Article 6

- (1) The Judicial Commission has 7 (seven) members.
- (2) Members of the Judicial Commission are state officials.
- (3) The membership of the Judicial Commission as referred to in paragraph (1) consists of:
- a. 2 (two) former judges;
- b. 2 (two) legal practitioners;
- c. 2 (two) legal academics; and
- d. 1 (one) member of the community.

Meanwhile, the authority of the Judicial Commission in the Judicial Commission Law Number 22 of 2004 regulates the authority of the Judicial Commission to only two, namely proposing the appointment of Supreme Court Justices to the DPR and upholding the honor and dignity and maintaining the behavior of judges. Meanwhile, in the amendment to Law Number 18 of 2011 Article 13, the authority of the judicial commission is expanded, namely:

The Judicial Commission has the authority:

- a. Propose the appointment of supreme court justices and ad hoc judges in the Supreme Court to the DPR for approval;
- b. Maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges;

- c. Determine the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judges' Conduct together with the Supreme Court; and
- d. Maintain and uphold the implementation of the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judges' Conduct.

Meanwhile, the duties of the Judicial Commission are regulated in Article 14 paragraph (1) of Law Number 22 of 2004, which explains that the duties of the Judicial Commission are:

In exercising the authority as referred to in Article 13 letter a, the Judicial Commission has the following duties:

- a. registering candidates for Supreme Court Justice;
- b. selecting candidates for Supreme Court Justice;
- c. determining candidates for Supreme Court Justice; and
- d. submitting candidates for Supreme Court Justice to the DPR.

In the amendment to Law Number 22 of 2011 concerning the Judicial Commission in Article 20 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) are:

(1) In order to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity and behavior of judges, the Judicial Commission has the task of:

- a. monitor and supervise the behavior of Judges;
- receive reports from the public regarding violations of the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judges' Conduct;
- c. verify, clarify, and investigate reports of alleged violations of the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judges' Conduct in private;
- d. decide whether or not reports of alleged violations of the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judges' Conduct are true; and
- e. take legal and/or other steps against individuals, groups of people, or legal entities that undermine the honor and dignity of Judges.

(2) In addition to the duties as referred to in paragraph (1), the Judicial Commission also has the task of striving to improve the capacity and welfare of judges.

The supervisory authority held by the Judicial Commission is currently limited to supervising judges other than judges of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court Justices as a result of the Constitutional Court's decision Number: 005/PUU-IV/2006. Constitutional Court judges and Supreme Court justices who are free from KY supervision will have a negative impact on Constitutional Court judges and Supreme Court justices so that Abuse Of Power will occur so that they will make decisions outside the applicable legal rules and will tend to be arrogant. Saldi Isra on his official website criticized the issuance of Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006 and said that there are 4 (four) implications of the decision, namely: 24

First, judicial corruption. One of the concerns of many people who are concerned about the world of justice is that the Constitutional Court Decision will further foster corrupt practices in the judicial process (judicial corruption). In the language of Denny Indrayana, Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006 will foster judicial mafia practices. In fact, there is also an assessment that constitutional judges are not much different from other judges (constitutional judges are also judges).

Second, the legal vacuum (at the statutory level) regarding the implementation of the KY's supervisory function. Another implication of Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006 is the emergence of a legal vacuum regarding the implementation of supervision of judges by the KY. With this incident, supervision of judges has again relied on internal supervision. In fact, so far, internal supervision has been considered suboptimal in supervising deviant practices by judges. On page 201 of the Constitutional Court Decision No. 005/PUU-IV/2006 it is stated:

Third, the strengthening of the crisis of trust in the Constitutional Court. Another impact is the emergence of a crisis of public trust in the Constitutional Court. Many people believe that in recent times, it has begun to appear that decisions are increasingly moving away from the idea of legal reform. One of the Constitutional Court decisions that has received sharp criticism is the statement that there is no binding force in part of the explanation of Article 2 Paragraph (1) of the Corruption Eradication Law. In a rather cynical language, Teten Masduki said that the tendency of the Constitutional Court to "kill the children of reform" is beginning to be seen.

Fourth, the strengthening of discourse to review the authority of the Constitutional Court. This discourse was developed by some members of the DPR. Based on the results of research by the Center for Law and Policy Studies (2005), there were many notes or real dislikes from members of the DPR. The argument developed by some members of the DPR: "how can the decision of nine people beat the product of 550 people?" Although it is almost impossible to reduce the authority of the Constitutional Court at the level of law, the strengthening of this discourse among legislators must still be noted separately. However, if this happens, this country will lose the meaning of the presence of the Constitutional Court as the guardian of the constitution.²⁵

²⁴ Isra, Saldi. "Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No 005/PUU-IV/2006 (Isi, Implikasi, dan Masa Depan Komisi Yudisial). *Saldi Isra*. Accessed May 31, 2025.

²⁵ Liu Mingyu. "Nature of New Power of Supervision and Judicial Supervision." *China Legal Sci.* 7, no. 3 (2019): 123.

The purpose of supervision and enforcement of the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges by the Judicial Commission, does not reach the technical judicial issues because it is related to the independence of the judge (independence of judiciary) in deciding cases. However, the case file can be reviewed by the Judicial Commission if there are facts of reprehensible judge behavior in the case file that result in the issuance of a verdict. "If the judge's assessment of the trial facts stated in the verdict has deviated from the judge's proper behavior."²⁶ The main principle that must be a guideline for the Judicial Commission is that the implementation of its authority must not be carried out in order to intervene in the freedom and independence of the Judicial Commission. The Judicial Commission must not enter into the technical issues of ongoing judicial matters. The main principle is that the Judicial Commission only examines decisions that have been decided in a trial that is open to the public. The results of the Judicial Commission's examination do not cancel the decision but only result in the imposition of sanctions for the judge concerned if it is proven that there were elements of intent and error in deciding the case. For the court above it, the results of the Judicial Commission's examination can be used as a consideration in issuing an appeal, cassation or judicial review decision.27

The supervisory function of the Judicial Commission in terms of supervising the implementation of judicial power, is viewed in one orientation, namely in order to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of Judges, normatively the Judicial Commission has the task of monitoring and supervising the behavior of Judges, receiving reports from the public regarding violations of the Code of Ethics and/or Guidelines for Judges' Conduct, verifying, clarifying, and investigating reports of alleged violations of the Code of Ethics and/or guidelines for judges' conduct in private, deciding whether or not reports of alleged violations of the Code of Ethics and/or guidelines for judges' conduct are true. The Judicial Commission also has the task of striving to improve the capacity and welfare of Judges.

3. Supervision of Judges by the Supreme Court

Normatively, the Supreme Court has several authorities, including adjudicating at the cassation level, examining laws and regulations under the law against the law, and having other authorities granted by law as regulated in Article 24A paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. One of the other

²⁶ Charles Simabura. "Membangun Sinergi Dalam Pengawasan Hakim." *Jurnal Konstitusi* 6, no. 2 (2009): 43-62.

²⁷ Frans Samuel Junero Butarbutar, and Irwan Triadi. "Implementasi Prinsip Demokrasi dalam Sistem Hukum Tata Negara." Birokrasi: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Dan Tata Negara 2, no. 3 (2024): 264-273.

authorities referred to is the authority to carry out the highest supervision of the implementation of justice in all judicial bodies under the Supreme Court in the implementation of judicial power as regulated in Article 39 paragraph (1) of Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power. Technically, the Supreme Court has the authority to carry out the highest supervision of the implementation of administrative and financial duties as regulated in Article 39 paragraph (2) of Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power. Likewise, internal supervision carried out by the Supreme Court also includes supervision of the behavior of Judges as regulated in Article 39 paragraph (3) of Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power. However, all forms of supervision and authority of the Supreme Court must not reduce the freedom of judges in examining and deciding cases as regulated in Article 39 paragraph (4) of Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power. Thus, internal supervision by the Supreme Court has limitations, namely not interfering with or even intervening in Judges in carrying out their main duties and functions in deciding cases.²⁸

Based on the normative provisions above, it can be explained regarding the objects and targets of supervision of the Supreme Court which include the Judicial Institution consisting of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance in the four judicial environments under the Supreme Court. This supervision also covers all aspects of the administration of justice in terms of management, administration and public services which include trial administration, case administration, case financial administration, execution, DIPA financial administration, personnel administration, general leadership administration, discipline enforcement, inter-agency cooperation, complaint handling, public services and also those related to the behavior of Judges both when carrying out their duties and actions that should not be carried out by a Judge as required in the Judge's code of conduct.²⁹

Technically, the Supreme Court as an organization has a supervisory work unit, namely the Supervisory Body, which has the special task and responsibility to supervise 829 Work Units in the Judicial Body throughout Indonesia, so the workload that must be completed by the Supreme Court Supervisory Body is very large, especially in following up on all reports of

²⁸ Achmad Mitftah Farid, Hibnu Nugroho, and Dwi Hapsari Retnaningrum. "Pelaksanaan Fungsi Pengawasan Terhadap Perilaku Hakim Oleh Mahkamah Agung." *Soedirman Law Review* 2, no. 1 (2020): 15. See also, Ratu Tasya Salsabila, Irwandi Irwandi, and Muhammad Eriton. "Analisis Kewenangan Antara Mahkamah Agung Dengan Komisi Yudisial Dalam Pengawasan Hakim Berdasarkan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan." *Limbago: Journal of Constitutional Law* 4, no. 1 (2024): 82.

²⁹Amran Suadi, *Manajemen Pengawasan Badan Peradilan di Indonesia,* Jakarta, Rejeki Agung, 2011.

complaints from the public directly and recommendations from the Judicial Commission.³⁰

The supervisory body has carried out internal supervisory duties including regular supervision of complaint handling, other examinations such as monitoring, performance and integrity audits, financial reviews and following up on the findings of the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), the Minister of Empowerment of State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform and other related agencies. In principle, the Supreme Court Supervisory Body carries out one of the management functions to maintain and control so that the tasks that must be carried out can run properly in accordance with the applicable plans and regulations, while also carrying out part of the Supreme Court's duties to supervise the implementation of justice and supervision of the behavior and actions of Judges in all judicial environments. For that, the Supervisory Agency has prepared several rules as a standard of supervision, including the Decree of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Number: KMA/080/SK/VI/2006 Concerning the Implementation of Judicial Supervision known as Book IV, Decree of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Number: 076/KMA/SK/VI/2009 Concerning Guidelines for the Implementation of Complaint Handling in the Judicial Institutions, Joint Regulation between the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia and the Chairman of the Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia Number 02/PB/MA/IX/2012-02/PB/P.KY/09/2012 Concerning Complaints on the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for the Conduct of Judges. Through several existing legal umbrellas, the Supervisory Agency exercises its authority in terms of internal supervision of judges, although it is very difficult to implement.

Given the heavy burden of the Supreme Court Supervisory Body's duties, in order to make the judicial supervision duties effective, the Supreme Court carries out supervisory duties towards the High Court. Supervisory duties for general courts are carried out by the High Court towards each District Court within its jurisdiction. The responsibility for these supervisory duties lies with the Chief Justice of the High Court.³¹

Supervision of judges is "non-technical supervision of the judiciary and concerns the personal aspects of judges, because this supervision is part of the development of the personal aspects of judges."³² According to Irfan

³⁰ A. Antikowati and Mardi Handono. "Reinforcement of Judicial Supervision Function by Judicial Commission and Supreme Court as a Form of Shared Responsibility System." *Sociological Jurisprudence Journal* 1, no. 2 (2018): 139.

³¹ Zamroni Faizal Abdi and Chintya Khaerunnisa. "Revitalization of Supervision of the Judicial Commission as Strengthening Judicial Institutions in Maintaining the Independence and Integrity of Judges." *JUSTICES: Journal of Law* 3, no. 3 (2024): 193.

³² Muhammad Asrun, *Krisis Peraditan: Mahkamah Agung di Bawah Soeharto*, Jakarta, ELSAM, 2004.

Fachruddin, the Chief Justice of the Appellate Court, who is referred to as the vanguard of the Supreme Court, is entrusted with the responsibility of supervision by the Supreme Court over judges and court staff, and is basically an extension of the Supreme Court through the Decree of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Number: KMA/096/SK/X/2006.

Likewise, the responsibility for supervision delegated to the Chief Justice of the first instance by the Supreme Court towards judges and court staff is basically an extension of the Supreme Court through the Decree of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Number: KMA/096/SK/X/2006. With the mechanism for the delegation of authority for the implementation of supervision, the role of the judicial body under the Supreme Court in exercising control over Judges in particular and the implementation of judicial power in general becomes more effective. Thus, this can emphasize the strategic role of the Supreme Court in the context of legal and justice services for justice seekers in Indonesia through effective and efficient guidance and supervision of Judges.

4. Supervision Through Code of Ethics

Supervision of judges is not only carried out by the internal Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission, but supervision of judges can be carried out by the public through supervision of the code of ethics of judges' behavior which was last ratified in 2012, namely the Joint Regulation between the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia and the Chief Justice of the Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia Number 02/PB/MA/IX/2012-02/PB/P.KY/09/2012 Concerning Complaints of the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judges' Behavior. In the code of ethics and guidelines for judges' behavior, 10 points have been set out as references for the code of ethics of judges' behavior along with their explanations, namely in Article 4:

- 1. Behave fairly
- 2. Behave honestly
- 3. Behave wisely and judiciously
- 4. Behave independently
- 5. Have high integrity
- 6. Be responsible
- 7. Uphold self-esteem
- 8. Be highly disciplined
- 9. Behave humbly, and
- 10. Behave professionally.

Supervision of judges through the code of ethics is carried out by elements of society, both individually, in groups (NGOs), and also on social media. As is known, in the era of modern democracy such as today, the flow of information through the press or social media is very open, especially with the existence of various legal umbrellas related to transparency of public services and the involvement of community participation in realizing public accountability as a driver of press freedom.³³ As is known, after the reformation, the power of the press has become a democratic force in the life of the Indonesian nation. The press has become an effective means of control and supervision in the implementation of state power, both executive, legislative and judicial.

In the context of monitoring the implementation of judicial power, the press can be a supervisor of the trial process of a case, besides that the press can also provide information and facts related to the implementation of justice services by the courts.³⁴ The flow of public openness is a driver for people seeking justice to dare to reveal irregularities or suboptimal justice services in general by the judicial apparatus and especially to judges through supervision of the code of ethics that can be followed up by authorized formal institutional supervisory institutions such as the Judicial Commission or the Supreme Court Supervisory Body. Functionally, supervision carried out by the press in the form of facts and data can be a remedy for improving judicial institutions, besides that the press can also be used as an effective means of presenting information about improving justice services by the courts. Thus, social media can be a social control over the implementation of judicial power by the judges themselves.

According to Lotulung,³⁵ the enforcement of the rule of law requires the existence of pillars or components of a free press but which must also be within the bounds of transparency accountability. Like the independent type, the press must also be protected from all influences that can dwarf the function of the press itself, thus hindering freedom of expression. The role and function of the press as one of the control or supervisory institutions is a strategic means in the process of realizing the rule of law, because through its "strength"

³³ Wahyu Aji Ramadan, Irma Aulia Pertiwi Nusantara, and Tanti Mitasari. "Reformulasi pengawasan Mahkamah Konstitusi demi meningkatkan efektivitas penegakan kode etik hakim konstitusi." *Jurnal Studia Legalia* 3, no. 02 (2022): 40.

³⁴ Rozana Sukma Dewi, Avien Zakaria, and Aghnia Safana Ilmi. "Ethical Supervision of Judges to Improve the Integrity of the Constitutional Court." *Journal of Indonesian Constitutional Law* 1, no. 3 (2024): 242.

³⁵ Lotulung, Paulus E. "Kebebasan Hakim dalam Sistem Penegakan Hukum." In Makalah disampaikan pada Seminar Pembangunan Hukum Nasional VIII, Tema "Penegakan Hukum dalam Era Pembangunan Berkelanjutan", Diselenggarakan oleh Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional Departemen Kehakiman Dan Hak Asasi Manusia RI, Denpasar, pp. 14-18. 2003.

the press can increase public awareness of the implementation of justice "social control" can be implemented better justice.

The press has a large and influential role in the implementation of the independence of the Judicial Power. It is through press reporting that the public obtains information on whether the judicial process has been carried out properly or not. Therefore, press freedom has implications as a control institution but also as an institution that provides information correctly, accurately and impartially to the public about the performance of judicial bodies. The limitations or guidelines that must be considered are that press reporting must be informative and even contain analysis so that supervision by the Press in order to improve the judiciary.³⁶

The interaction between the Judicial Power and the world of the press becomes a performance that respects each other through increasing the integrity and professional attitude of each party, both the ranks of the Judicial Power apparatus itself and the press in providing responsible news from the press. Indeed, from the news in the press and in the reality of practice in the field, it shows that the freedom of Judges in upholding the law and justice is often deviated from by the personal weaknesses of the Judge himself who cannot act firmly because he is influenced by internal factors of the judge or by external factors of the judge. The function of supervision of the duties and performance of judges who must work professionally is carried out effectively, consistently and firmly. "This supervision can be internal or external through supervision of the code of ethics, which is preventive or repressive, which must be optimized and empowered."

D. CONCLUSION

Supervision of judges in Indonesia is a key element in maintaining the integrity, independence, and professionalism of the judicial system, as outlined in this study. This supervision is carried out through three main approaches: internal supervision by the Supreme Court (MA), external supervision by the Judicial Commission (KY), and public supervision through a code of ethics. These three mechanisms aim to ensure that judicial power is exercised in accordance with the law and ethics, prevent abuse of authority, and maintain public trust in the judiciary. The MA's internal supervision, which is regulated in Law Number 48 of 2009, covers administrative, financial, and behavioral aspects of judges, carried out through the MA Supervisory Body. However, the large workload and limited resources often hinder its effectiveness. On the other hand, the KY, which is tasked with maintaining the honor and behavior

³⁶ Titik Triwulan Tutik. "Position and Functions of Judges in Enforcing the Supreme of the Law: Case Study of Code of Ethics Violation by Judge." Walisongo Law Review (Walrev) 3, no. 2 (2021): 220.

of judges based on Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution, faces challenges due to limited authority following the Constitutional Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, which exempts MK judges and Supreme Court justices from its supervision. This decision raises the risk of judicial corruption, a legal vacuum in supervision, a crisis of public trust, and discourse on reviewing the MK's authority.

Public oversight through a code of ethics, as stipulated in the Joint Regulation of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission 2012, plays an important role in increasing accountability through information transparency and the role of the media. However, overlapping authority between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission, as well as a lack of awareness and integrity from both supervisors and those being supervised, are major obstacles. This study concludes that effective judicial oversight requires better coordination between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission, strengthening the authority of the Judicial Commission, and increasing the role of the public through education and transparency. Thus, a constructive oversight system can strengthen judicial independence, prevent abuse of authority, and ensure justice that is in accordance with the expectations of the Indonesian people.

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