DISIPLIN PASAR DAN PENGATURAN PERBANKAN: KOMPLEMEN ATAU SUBSTITUSI?

Abstract

The banking crises over the last two decades around the world has renewed the interest
in market discipline in banking systems. This interest is not merely academic, but it also
apparent in recent policy initiatives such as the latest capital proposal by The Basel Commitee
on Banking Supervision. The new Basel Capital Accord has 3 pillars. Pillar 3 is disclosure
requirement to enhance market discipline. Market discipline has the potential to reinforce
pillar 1 ( minimum capital standar) and pillar 2 (supervisory review process) and promote safety
and soundness in banks and financial systems. The first objective of this paper is to explain
bank regulatory and the important of market discipline to complement bank regulatory. The
second objective is to explain the framework of market discipline theory and ask some issue:
what is market discipline, why the call for market discipline, how market discipline relates to
agency conflict in finance theory and how is the framework of market discipline in banking.
The third objective is to review some empirical research in market discipline.
Keywords : Banking Crises, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline and Bank Regulatory